In the summer of 2020, the Adler district of Sochi erected a bronze statue (monument) to honor the heroism of the Tsarist troops that occupied the Caucasus. The public was informed that the monument had been erected at the suggestion of the city’s parliamentarians. However, the monument was dismantled a week after the installation. The city administration explained that the monument was demolished because the installation was illegal, but the Circassian community explained that the decision was a concession to the Circassian people. They believed this monument was humiliated Circassian national because they suffered under the Tsarist invasion of the Caucasus. Today in different parts of the Caucasus you can see a large number of monuments, memorial complexes and sculptures honoring the Russian imperial generals and troops who invaded the region. For Russia, these monuments honor the valor and heroism of the Russian Imperial Army during the occupation of the Caucasus. For the peoples of the Caucasus, however, these monuments remind them of the pain the Russian Empire inflicted on their ancestors, of the trampling of their national dignity, of mass repressions and deportations.
January of this year was the 220th anniversary of the occupation of Ganja by Russian troops and May the 160th anniversary of the Russian invasion of the entire Caucasus. On 21 May 1864, the mountain village of Kbaade in the presence of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolayevich marked the de facto end of the Caucasian War with thanksgiving prayers to honor the victory over the Circassians.[1] Given that Russia’s invasion of the Caucasus began in the 18th century, we can say that this was the longest and bloodiest war in the history of the Russian Empire.
In 1819, the commander of the Russian Caucasus Army Aleksey Yermolov arrived at Akusha, a village located 2000 meters above sea level in the mountains of Dagestan. Russian historiography claims that the Russian Empire mobilized a 250.000-strong army to subjugate the North Caucasus alone. According to official sources, more than 70.000 Russian troops were killed over the course of the ensuing War, which was led by eight Russian generals beginning with Aleksey Yermolov.[2] Indigenous losses were never recorded. Approximate calculations show that more than two million people were killed in the course of actual military engagements, armed clashes and forced deportations. Unlike the South Caucasus, which was occupied in two phases with pairs of wars against Qajar Persia and the Ottoman Empire (1804-1813, 1826-1828 and 1806-1812, 1828-1829, respectively), there are deep socio-political reasons why the North Caucasus resisted for years and was ultimately defeated with heavy losses.
On September 22, 1859, Yermolov convened with Shamil, the leader of the national liberation movement of the North Caucasus, who had been captured, in Moscow. During the meeting, Shamil accused Yermolov, stating that, were it not for Yermolov’s actions, his people would have been able to live in peace. In response, Yermolov highlighted that his intention was to bring peace, tranquility, and development to the Caucasus. Did the Russian generals – Aleksey Yermolov, Ivan Paskevich, and Mikhail Vorontsov – really want to bring peace, tranquility and development to the region with their invasion? What was their attitude towards the local population? How did their human qualities and ethical values influence their attitudes and behavior in the conquered territory? Were these generals simply carrying out the will of the Russian emperors, or were they also involved in planning and justifying these invasions? The best answer to these questions is provided by the generals’ personal letters, diaries, memoirs, correspondence as well as drafts and reports prepared by them and submitted on behalf of the emperors. Three of these generals played an important role in the future fate of the Caucasus. Aleksey Yermolov commanded the Caucasian military forces between 1816 and 1827. Ivan Paskevich fought the Russo-Iranian and Russo-Ottoman wars between 1826 and 1829, and Mikhail Vorontsov ruled the Caucasus for more than 10 years, from 1844 to 1854, as the first viceroy.
These imperial generals’ personal notes testify to their adherence to Slavophilia.[3]They believed they were defending Russia’s interests against the Western powers in the East. The five generals—Aleksey Yermolov, Ivan Paskevich, Mikhail Vorontsov, Aleksandr Baryatinsky and Nikolay Yevdokimov—who commanded the Russian Caucasus army, developed plans to bring order to the newly acquired lands. The ideas they generated and implemented had a serious impact not only on the administrative structure of the Caucasus, but also on the social life, religious views and national identity of the Caucasians.
General Yevdokimov stated in an 1861 meeting with Alexander II that Russia needed a five-year war and a fighting generation to completely conquer the Caucasus. Otherwise, the conquest of the Caucasus would take decades and snuff out several generations. Four years after this meeting, the Russian Empire officially declared an end to the Caucasian War, and a number of Russian generals received the title “conqueror of the Caucasus” for commanding this war. In addition to their role as military leaders, these generals played a significant part in shaping the ideological and foreign policy orientation of the Russian Empire.
Generals that played a role in the fate of the Caucasus
Russia’s aggressive military action against Chechnya in the late 20th and early 21st centuries was one of the important reasons that drew researchers’ attention back to the original conquest. Scholars, politicians and military officers began to analyze the thoughts of those who pioneered the Russian imperial occupation of the Caucasus in the 18th and 19th centuries, what ideology informed these generals, and how much generals and thinkers justified the empire’s Caucasian policy. The greatest contributions in this field were made by Russian historiographers themselves. One of the most important steps in this direction was the publication of primary sources, archival documents, memoirs, and letters that reflected the personal position of people directly involved in the occupation of the Caucasus. The Struggle with the West, [4] The Geopolitics of Panslavism,[5] State Order. Russia and the Caucasus,[6] The Strategy for the Eastern Lands[7] were published as part of a project titled “Russian Civilization.” These texts are important for their analysis of the ideology underlying Russia’s Caucasian policies, who was involved in these policies and for what purpose they were created. These publications also allow us to look at Russia’s Caucasian policy from different perspectives and shed light on the relations between the province and the center, the colonial administration and the metropolitan authorities.
The first encounter between the Slavs and Caucasian peoples took place in the Middle Ages, but Russia undertook active invasions of the Caucasus in the early 18th century. Peter I after his victory in the Northern War and his self-designation as emperor, had ambitious plans for Iran’s Caspian provinces. The initial step to implement these plans was a comprehensive study of the geography, history and economy of the Caucasus. The famous German scientist and explorer Samuel Gmelin was assigned to carry out this work. Gmelin spent the last seven years of his life on the southern borders of the Russian Empire, studying the natural riches of the provinces located on the eastern and western shores of the Caspian Sea and trying to answer the question why Tsarist Russia should invade the Caucasus. Gmelin was taken prisoner by Qaytaq utsmiy Amir Hamza Khan and died of illness in 1774 in Ahmadkent.[8] The scientific study of the Caucasus was subsequently followed by the region’s conquest. The military was a primary agent in the implementation of this plan.
At the beginning of the 19th century, taking advantage of favorable international conditions, the Russian authorities sent the first organized military mission to the Caucasus. This mission was led by General Aleksey Yermolov. Yermolov is presented in Russian historical literature as an arrogant, cruel and merciless man with a ruthless attitude towards his enemies. Yermolov, was not always good with the emperors because of these characteristics as well as his so-called “freethinking” (i.e., inclination towards nationalism and democracy). In 1816 the general began the annexation of the Caucasus to the Russian Empire. A year later he was sent to the court of the Qajar Shah Fath-Ali as the special and first imperial ambassador. Yermolov was the first general who refused to win over the local nobility, which changed the strategy and tactics of the Russian Empire’s Caucasian policy. Yermolov understood that the subjugation of the Caucasus was a long and difficult process; in the invasion plan sent to the emperor, he proposed the construction of fortresses, the resettlement of state peasants in the Caucasus and the Russification of the region for the successful implementation of this process. Russian general Erkert wrote that he was as cruel as the local tribes. In a letter to Denis Davydov[9] in January 1820, Yermolov justified his cruelty: “I found the Asian approach to be more effective, as I understood that the proconsul of the Caucasus would be unable to alter the harsh nature of local traditions with a soft heart.” [10] Yermolov believed that the fear caused by his name alone “should better protect the borders of the Russian Empire than chains and fortifications. I want my word to be law, or rather inevitable death, for Asians. In the eyes of Asians, modesty is a sign of weakness, and I am cruel and ruthless because I love humanity. One execution will save hundreds of Russians from death and thousands of Muslims from betrayal.”[11] Yermolov also explained his cruelty towards the Caucasians by referencing their negative attitude towards Russian troops. Comparing the Southern and North Caucasian lords, he wrote that after the military occupation of Ganja, all the khanates in the Southern Caucasus realized that it was more expedient to become subjects of Russia, but the same could not be said about the rulers in the North Caucasus. Citing the Garaqaytag and Gazikumukh utsmiys[12] as an example, he wrote that they did not pay any taxes to the imperial treasury, and Russians could pass through their territories only under military protection. The khans of the South Caucasus, who were subject to Russia, were granted the rank of major general and a monthly salary, which served to guarantee their fidelity to the empire.The general noted that such an offer was not valid for the Gazikumukh and Kaytagh subjugators.[13] To justify his harshness, Yermolov cited as an example the everyday life of the Caucasians. For him, the Chechens, living in the lower reaches of the River Terek, were the worst of the robbers who attacked Russians. Small-numbered Chechens were settled in fairly vast territories, but since these territories consisted of impenetrable forests, they were not suitable for sowing grain or grazing cattle, according to Yermolov. It is for this reason that Chechens are not doing any useful work, they earn their living by brigandage.[14] Yermolov is said to have believed that Chechens, therefore, could not be educated and that the best way to subjugate them was their total destruction. Caucasians, in Yermolov’s judgment, are “simple, dull-witted and not possessing reasoning capabilities” people. And the poverty of the region’s population stems from their laziness and naivety. [15]
Russia’s invasion of the Caucasus was accompanied by the formation of an ideology justifying a brutal policy towards the native population. Vorontsov in his letters to the Yermolov discussed the backwardness of the local population and emphasized that they posed a serious threat to Russia’s eastern borders. He regretfully noted that it was impossible to awaken the European spirit in Eastern societies.[16] Unlike Yermolov, Vorontsov did not berate the Caucasians with curses, but in his letters, he presented them as foolish and arrogant. Vorontsov also admitted that most of the Russian officials involved in managing Caucasian estates were despicable, adding that it was necessary to conduct an open military operation against them because of their horrific abuses of natives. [17]
Russian ruling circles formed negative opinions about the Caucasian indigenous population in the early 19th century. They began to be convinced that the locals were illiterate, immoral and indifferent masses. According to Vorontsov, the Caucasians were a mass worthy of cruel treatment, like a flock of sheep or cattle, and the only way to protect civilized Russia from ignorant Caucasians was war against them.[18] Both the ruling class and the military thought that the invasion and subjugation of the Caucasus was important for the defense of Russia’s border in the east.
Russian generals noted the need to Russify and Christianize the region’s population to ensure security. And the lack of democracy, law and discipline were considered the most important indicators of backwardness in the Caucasus. Yermolov wrote that the most important advantage of tyranny in the East was presence of legislative power and private property.[19]
Russian generals and military officers were aware of the social conditions of Caucasian societies and the political situation in the region. For them, Caucasian societies were disorganized, fragmented and extremely religious. Of course, the 19th century Caucasus had its own customs, laws and rules, but these rules were not understood by the Russian natives who considered themselves Europeans. In the reports from Russian officials in the Caucasus to the center, especially personally to Alexander I and Nicholas I, special importance was assigned to two issues related to the occupation of the Caucasus: First, the Russian generals thought that if the Caucasus was not occupied by Russia, it would come under Western control. Second, Russia’s invasion would put the population of the Ottoman Empire and the Persian state in a difficult situation, which, according to the generals, created favorable conditions for Russia to strengthen in the region.
Russian generals were also determining the future eastern borders of the empire. According to them, Russia should advance in the Caucasus in three directions: westward towards the Asian territories of Türkiye, southward towards the northern territories of Persia, and eastward towards Turkestan. The Russian generals in the Caucasus referred to Emperor Nicholas I’s plan for an attack on India via the Caspian Sea as a “strange” plan and attempted to dissuade the emperor from this dangerous and meaningless undertaking.[20] The Russian generals wrote to the emperor about where to stop and what not to do. During his trip from Tiflis to the Persian royal court, Yermolov noted in a report addressed to Alexander I, who was prepared to return some of the occupied territories and sit at the negotiating table for peace with the Shah of Persia, that “rumors about Russia’s intention to return certain khanates to Persia are causing difficulties. I issued a statement promising the inhabitants of the khanates that not an inch of our territory will be given to anyone.”[21] In this report, Yermolov was essentially warning the emperor that any territorial concession would be unacceptable to him. Without notifying Alexander I, Yermolov had sent a delegation to Turkestan and the Khanate of Khiva, establishing trade relations in the region.[22] During his visit to Fath-Ali Shah’s court, Yermolov disregarded the emperor’s instructions to recognize Abbas Mirza[23] as the heir. In his records, Yermolov justified this by expressing doubts about Abbas Mirza’s potential to be a beneficial political figure for the empire.[24] Another commander of the Caucasian Corps, Ivan Paskevich, rejected the conventions proposed by Abbas Mirza and initiated military operations without the emperor’s permission. To justify his decision, the general wrote in his apology letter to the emperor, stating, “An attack on Tehran was expected to lead to the overthrow of the Qajar dynasty and incite the discontented population against their legitimate authority.”[25] It was Nicholas I who saved the Qajar dynasty from being overthrown. The emperor, being an absolute monarch, did not want to set a precedent by deposing another ruler through military means.
Paskevich, was convinced that a destructive and fast military campaign, unlike Yermolov’s, which he believed was slow and harsh, would completely subdue the Caucasus and gain him greater fame than his predecessor. The harsh tone in Paskevich’s letters to Nicholas I likely stemmed from this stance. In one letter, the general wrote: “The more I observe, the more convinced I am that our policy and our attitude towards the mountaineers have been wrong; we have had neither a common plan nor stable rules. Cruelty has only fueled hatred and incited a desire for revenge, while the lack of firmness and decisiveness is generally explained by weakness and a lack of power. My four years of governance have confirmed the correctness of my policy, which involved showing leniency when needed but mostly threatening with my resolve and strength. Therefore, even with a small number of our troops engaged in war with the Turks and Persians, we were able to keep the mountaineers in check, with only minor raids occurring.”[26]
In reports presented to the emperors, Russian army generals wrote about the social problems created by the Russian army in the region. They noted that neighboring states forced to fight against Russia were increasing taxes on their populations to finance military operations, thus worsening the plight of the masses. In the reports they stated that “the local population harbors hatred towards their governments, and a national state holds no significance for them. This creates favorable conditions for the advance of our army.”[27] Comparing the governance of Persia and the Ottoman Empire, Yermolov argued that there was no system of administration or rule of law in Persia and that the people suffered under the shah’s absolute authority. Paskevich referred to the hatred of the Persian population and Shia clergy towards the Qajar dynasty.[28]
The reports, personal correspondence, and arguments presented by Russian generals active in the Caucasus are crucial for understanding how the future of Caucasian societies was determined. Until the mid-19th century, the Russian ruling elite had limited information about Caucasian societies. The first comprehensive insights about the Caucasus were reflected in reports prepared by the generals who invaded the region and sent to imperial administration. Before Yermolov’s emergence on the political scene in the Caucasus, Russian generals employed a policy of seduction and bribery to subjugate local societies. Yermolov was the first general to reject this approach. He believed that Caucasians could only be governed by force. Both Yermolov and his later successor as governor-general Vorontsov were convinced that the absence of civil social traditions and civic governance granted the local ruling class unlimited power to reduce ordinary people to a state of servitude.[29] In addition, for these men, the lack of political institutions, national unity, and a sense of national identity, combined with the powerlessness of the ordinary population under local rulers justified the brutal wars of subjugation in the Caucasus. In the official and personal correspondence of Russian generals, these two factors became powerful justifications for the invasion.
The generals believed that the Russian occupation differed significantly from European overseas colonization. The generals argued that European countries, especially England and France, were able to create Asian colonies by coincidence, while the invasion of the Caucasus was the result of a deliberate policy of the Russian military. In this regard, General Rostislav Fadeyev wrote that “the fate of the people living along our vast southern borders from the Black Sea to the Pacific Ocean is our own business.”[30] The Russian generals stated they had good intentions to organize the social life of the local communities. These goals were based on two principles: Russification and Christianization of local societies.
Both the military and property administrations of the Russian Empire realized the special importance of religion for Caucasian societies. The role of Islam in defining the social, political and spiritual identity of the local population was undeniable. The Russian generals thought that religion had blinded the Asian peoples’ sense of national identity, turning them into dead nations. Any sectarian revolts, such as Muridism, Babism, etc., was seen as a protest of the local population against the policies of the ruling class. It was for this reason that the generals believed that Russification was the only way to rid these peoples of religious fanaticism.[31]
The assimilation of Asian peoples into Russian civilization and the creation of a civil law and court system were launched by Yermolov in 1822 in Nalchik. In parallel, the Russian administration was trying to break down the existing social relations in the region and grant local residents the same property rights regardless of their social status. However, this policy was not supported by the Tsar for obvious reasons, and as a result, the ordinary population of the Caucasus could not feel secure under Russian rule until the beginning of the 20th century. Yermolov, Vorontsov and Fadeyev often mentioned in their personal correspondence the lack of a sense of civic status among the people of the Caucasus.
Generals like Yermolov, Paskevich and Vorontsov sought to subjugate the will of the indigenous people to the Russians’ spiritual world, breaking local traditions and Islamic religious thinking. And subsequent generations of generals such as Alexandr Baryatinsky, Mikhail Dondukov-Korsakov and Mikhail Golitsyn tried to transform a Caucasian into a Russian citizen. In the first half of the 19th century, when the power and rule of the domestic ruling class had not been completely destroyed and Russian troops were engaged in active military operations against indigenous people, the generals had to survey and take into account the local chiefs’ views. During those years, ordinary people who had no civil rights were forced to live under the pressure of both the local authorities and the Russian command. Fadeyev wrote that Cossacks living close to Circassians constantly humiliated the latter, while the Circassian had no right to defend themselves.[32] The general wrote that it was common for Cossacks to kill, beat and insult local Circassians, and to confiscate their lands without any reason. He explained that Cossacks were armed, while Circassians were unarmed: “Insulting Circassians is an entertainment for many. In the eyes of the highlanders, long investigations and trials are evidence of impunity. The highlanders feel like moving to Turkey is their only option to avoid this lawlessness.” [33]
During the first period of invasions, the Russian Army assisted local khans and shamkhals in suppressing rebellions, uprisings and protests of the ordinary population. Describing the attitude of the heads of the khanates in the South Caucasus to the local population, Yermolov spoke about the cruelty of Ismail Khan of Sheki, about the severe punishments he imposed on the population, He noted that a large number of people from Sheki came to complain about the khan as soon as he reached Tiflis.[34] Russian General Ivan Dibich-Zabalkansky inspected the activities of general Yermolov as Commander-in-Chief and Consul-General of the Caucasus and described in a letter to Emperor Nicholas I in April 1827 the deplorable civil status of the ordinary people across the Caucasus and the huge number of death sentences imposed on the Muslim population.[35]
After the collapse of the Muridist Movement and the subjugation of Shamil, the situation somewhat changed. Russian generals’ reports and correspondence from the field began to analyze the attitude of the Russian administrative apparatus and civil officials towards the Muslim population. They provided essential input to analyze the Russian administration’s Caucasian policy. These data suggest that Russian ruling circles gradually realized that the administration of the eastern provinces should be carried out by a special government with certain conditions and goals, and this government should ensure Russian domination.[36] The Russian generals wrote that in order to establish such a government in the region, they needed orientalists from the Cadet Corps, but not those who received education in oriental studies departments of universities. All the generals believed that even if Russia brought civil rights to the Caucasus, the region should be under military rule. In an August 1859 letter to Emperor Nicholas I, Alexander Baryatinsky asked to divide the region into five military units (Left Flank, Right Flank, Caspian Region, Lezgi Line and Kutaisi Governor-General’s Office) and underlined the importance of giving their military commanders full freedom to govern the region in order to dispel uncertainties and confusion existing in the Caucasus.[37] The project was implemented shortly. Realizing the need to change the attitude towards community leaders to ensure peace in the Caucasus, Baryatinsky succeeded in getting the emperor to compromise with Shamil in captivity. This is confirmed by a letter to Baryatinsky by Shamil from Kaluga in August 1860. In the letter, Shamil thanked the viceroy for his love and care for his family and himself, adding that he owed him for the emperor’s favor.[38]
Russian generals prioritized three basic conditions to improve the situation and carry out reconstruction work in the Caucasus. First, construction of fortresses, second, economic development, and third, administrative reforms. The implementation of these projects largely depended on the head of the Caucasus administration apparatus. The generals’ attitude to the economic and trade potential of the region was different. For a long time working for the revival of the Caucasus, Yermolov believed that the Caucasus was economically unpromising and of little value. Vorontsov, Fadeyev and Baryatinsky, on the contrary, believed that the Caucasus was a rich and promising region. The policy of those who governed the Caucasus was determined by their attitude to Caucasian realities.
The generals’ personal relations had a severe impact on the economic and management policies pursued in the region. Paskevich in his letters to the emperor negatively assessed all steps taken by the Yermolov: the supplies and logistical support to the army, food, even his relations with local communities. Yermolov was considered the culprit of the conflict situation developed in the Yerevan and Nakhichevan khanates. Paskevich wrote to the emperor that “Yermolov, trusting his representative in Persia, believed the news of the Persian troops stationed on the border and avoided an open military confrontation. By launching the Persian campaign, I plan to prove how sincere he is.”[39]
One of the tragic aspects of the Russian empire’s invasion of the Caucasus is the mass extermination, relocation and expulsion of the local population from their homes (lands). Yermolov was personally opposed to the resettlement of a Western community to the Caucasus and believed that only Cossacks and Russians could be relocated to the region, while Vorontsov, Baryatinsky and Fadeyev thought that ethnic cleansing should be considered a premise to strengthen Russia’s influence in the region. The highest echelon of the Russian upper military class was against the expulsion of ordinary people from the territory where they had been living. General Fadeyev wrote that “the Circassian peasantry cannot be our enemy because only those who are free and retain military power fight against us. We must liberate all peasants whose owners have moved to Turkey.” [40]
Epilogue
Russian generals’ reports and personal letters are important not only for analyzing the occupation process and politics, but also for studying the socio-political problems that surfaced the invasion of the Caucasus. These materials make it possible to trace the social, political and economic transformation of the Caucasus under Russian rule. These generals, because they capable influenced the Tsar’s decisions, shaped the social perception of the Caucasus in Russian society. Their activity was ambivalent. Generals who fought for the ideas of the empire received high ranks for military achievements and became heroes. Expanding the borders of the empire, the generals also sought to strengthen Russia’s power and authority on the global stage. This led to their increased influence both at court and in society. The documents they prepared provide information about the personal qualities, capacities and abilities of the imperial generals. The brutality and harsh behavior towards indigenous peoples reflected in these documents is an important source of information to explain the major changes that occurred in the lives of Caucasian peoples.
Despite the fact that more than 100 years have passed since the break-up of the Russian empire and more than 30 years since the collapse of the USSR, Russian historiography prefers to remain silent about the tragedies that occurred during the occupation of the Caucasus. Both the Russian emperors and the generals bear responsibility for these tragedies. Currently, many statues in the North Caucasus have been erected to Russian generals[41] who carried out massacres, deportations and assimilation of the local population. Since some of these statues were erected after the fall of the Soviet empire, it is an indication that today’s Russian government and society ignore the national sentiments of the Caucasian peoples, continuing imperial policies and not wanting to bear any responsibility for historical tragedies. The imperial generals are presented to modern Russian society as national heroes and humanist leaders who brought civilization and culture to so-called “backward” Eastern peoples. And this view was justified to them because the common people lived in a state of slavery under the yoke of local rulers and their lack of democracy. Interestingly, the Russian scholars who encouraged this view are not at all confused by the fact that the empire itself was home to some 23 million enslaved peasant serfs by 1861, and that democratic reforms were gradually instituted throughout the empire only in the early 20th century.
[1]In Russian sources, “Cherkes” (or “Circassian” in English) was often used as a general term to identify the peoples of the Caucasus.
[2] It is believed that this figure included only losses by the regular imperial army, while in view of Cossack detachments and other military losses, it is estimated at around two million.
[3] This is a religious and philosophical current formed in Russia in the 1830s of the 19th century. Its supporters promoted the idea of Russia’s unique development path differring from that of Western Europe.
[4] Страхов Н. Борьба с Западом. Москва: Институт Русской цивилизации, 2010.
[5] Ламанский В. Геополитика Панславизма. Москва: Институт Русской цивилизации, 2010.
[6] Фадеев Р. Государственный порядок. Россия и Кавказ. Москва: Институт Русской цивилизации, 2010.
[7] Романов И. Стратегия восточных территорий. Москва: Институт Русской цивилизации, 2010.
[8] What is now Dagestan.
[9] Russian poet, lieutenant general, Yermolov’s cousin.
[10] Гордин Я.А. Кавказ: земля и кровь. Россия в Кавказской войне XIX века. СПб.: Журнал «Звезда», 2000, s.124
[11] Потто В. Кавказская война. Ермоловское время. Москва: Центрполиграф, 2022, т.2, с.10.
[12] The hereditary title of a ruler in the North Caucasus.
[13] А.П.Ермолов и его “Записки”. Москва: Высшая школа, 1991, с.274-279.
[14] Yenə orada, s.285-286.
[15] Записки, s.57.
[16]Удовик В. Воронцов. Приложение. Кавказские письма М. С. Воронцова к А.П.Ермолову. Москва: Молодая гвардия, 2004.
[17]Удовик, s.296.
[18]Записки А.Р.Ермолова. 1798–1826, Москва: Высшая школа, 1991, s.200
[19] Yenə orada, s.204.
[20] Фадеев Р. Государственный порядок. Россия и Кавказ. Москва: Институт Русской цивилизации, 2010, s.299
[21] Записки, s.203.
[22]Записки, s. 229–230.
[23] Abbas Mirza was both the heir to the throne and the commander-in-chief of the Persian army.
[24] Ibid., 293.
[25]В.К.П. Фельдмаршал Паскевич и дипломатия в 1827-1829 годах. Исторический вестник, 1992, в.48, №5, s.500
[26] Потто В. Кавказская война. Время Паскевича или Бунт Чечни. Тифлис 1889, т.5, с.3-4.
[27] Фадеев, s.285
[28] В.К.П. Фельдмаршал Паскевич и дипломатия в 1827-1829 годах. Исторический вестник, 1992, в.48, №5, s.496
[29]Записки, s. 208.
[30] Фадеев, s.290.
[31] Фадеев, s.281.
[32] Фадеев, s.405.
[33] Ibid., s.405-406.
[34] Записки, s.275.
[35] Ермолов, Дивич, Паскевич. Пусскав старина, 1872, №17, s.71.
[36] Фадеев, s.466.
[37]Генерал-фельдмаршал князь А. И. Барятинский и Кавказская война. 1815–1879 гг. // Русская старина, № 1. 1881, s.313.
[38]Кн. Александр Иванович Барятинский. 1859–1862 гг. // Русская старина, № 4. 1880, s.806.
[39] Ермолов, Дивич, Паскевич. Пусскав старина, 1872, №17, s.47.
[40] Фадеев, s.404.
[41] In 1998, 2008, and 2012, three monuments were erected in the Caucasus in honor of Yermolov.
