

The “Tatyana Bulokhova Crime” and Law Enforcement Agencies of Soviet Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan SSR)

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Law enforcement agencies are considered critical infrastructure and a symbol of power of countries. The quality of law enforcement, their behavior towards society and social image are a critical indicator of the nature of political power and civil society in that country. Sometimes an offense can become a source of information about the socio-political background of a state and the level of inclusiveness of society. The Dreyfus Affair in France and the Beilis Affair in Russia, for instance, are good examples in this regard. Hannah Arendt, an important figure in political philosophy, believed that power and violence were identified in all studies that analyzed the relationship between power and violence, maintaining that Max Weber defined states by ‘instruments of legitimate violence.’[\[1\]](#) For Arendt, who analyzed the relationship between political regimes and violence, it is possible to seriously persecute minorities and stifle freedom of thought in a democracy that is not regulated by laws, in contrast to a republic.[\[2\]](#) However, British sociologist Jock Young argued that the social behavior of law enforcement is an important marker of who is included in civil society.[\[3\]](#) In this article, I will describe how a criminal case committed in Kirovabad (now Ganja), the second most important industrial city of Azerbaijan since World War II, revealed problems related to the activities of Soviet Azerbaijan’s law enforcement agencies, as well as inter-ethnic relations set in the republic. This will allow us to form a view of law enforcement bodies after Stalin in the republic.

Bulokhova crime and crime in general in Kirovabad

In June 1956, Tatyana Bulokhova, a 24-year-old engineer from the Moscow State Institute on the Design of State Farm (Sovkhoz) Construction (*Giprosovhozstroy*), was delegated to the Seismic Station of the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences located in Kirovabad (modern Ganja). She arrived in Kirovabad late at night by train and decided to go directly to the seismic station as there were no empty place in the waiting room at the railway station. She got into a taxi near the station and disappeared. Bulokhova's dead body was found by a shepherd on the outskirts of the city eleven days after her arrival in the city. A forensic examination showed that Bulokhova bled to death after multiple blows to her neck and chest with a cutting tool.

Since the initial investigation into her death found nothing, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in August 1956, created a special commission of five people headed by Nikolai Dudorov, [\[4\]](#) the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, to conduct an investigation into the murder of Bulokhova. On 4 October 1956, the commission submitted an extensive report to the Central Committee. [\[5\]](#) The report contained interesting information about the work of Kirovabad law enforcement agencies, the staff, and the general situation of the city. Three days before the submission to the Central Committee, Deputy Minister Dudorov and Head of the Department of Administrative Bodies of the Central Committee Aleksey Yelichev made speeches at a meeting held in the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (AzCP) in Baku to discuss the report. Both Secretary of the Central Committee Imam Mustafayev and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Sadykh Rahimov agreed with the shortcomings highlighted by the report. In particular, the report suggested that party, state and law enforcement officials were deeply involved in crime in the republic.

The report noted that the Bulokhova criminal case had revealed an unprecedented rise in crime and robbery, as well as gross violation of Soviet law in Azerbaijan's Kirovabad and adjacent areas. The ten-page report included the results of meetings between commission members and Kirovabad and surrounding area residents, analyses of law enforcement investigative materials, and scrutiny of crime reports in the city and across the republic as a whole. The report highlighted the open operations of criminal groups and gangs in Kirovabad who kept the whole city in fear; the indifference of the party, Soviet and law enforcement agencies to numerous complaints from the population; bribery, lawlessness, robbery and theft. It noted the increase in cases of violence against women and discussed cases of abusive behavior towards, and sexual harassment of, women in the presence of their spouses, sons and brothers. The report also stated that city streets, parks and culture centers were completely empty after work, which local residents attributed to the rampant crime.

The authors of the report noted that the crime reports and statistics submitted to the center did not reflect the reality. For example, only four criminal cases of rape were initiated in police stations in 1955 and the first 8 months of 1956, while in fact there were 42 cases of rape in the mentioned period, about which representatives of other nationalities, especially Russian women, in most cases refused to contact police for various reasons. The police illegally refused to register 22 of 42 rape complaints. The report noted that the police and the prosecutor's office forced the raped girls to marry the perpetrator and let the crime go unpunished. Mostly Russian women faced rape, but Azerbaijani girls who came to Kirovabad in search of work from different regions of Azerbaijan were also subjected to rape. In this regard, the report noted the case of the 18-year-old Bakhshaliyeva who, having come from Nakhchivan to Kirovabad for work, was gang-raped in April 1956. [\[6\]](#) The police identified the perpetrators but did not arrest any of them.

This was because a city prosecutor had advised that one of the criminals to marry Bakhshaliyeva. Under threat of death, Bakhshaliyeva was forced to marry one of her rapists, and thus the criminal case was terminated. The perpetrators were arrested after the commission demanded a reopening of criminal proceedings.

The report stated that law enforcement agencies were negligent in investigating serious offences, which created conditions for the free movement of criminals and the exchange of large bribes. The report gave the murder of Ismayilov in 1953 as an example. Although witness testimony established the identity of the murderers, the perpetrators were not arrested and one of them was then a law student at Azerbaijan State University and owned two private cars (a Zil and a Pobeda). The deputy minister of the Soviet Union claimed that the city prosecutor Aliyev supported criminals and argued that Aliyev should be prosecuted.

The report said that the city saw 243 robberies, burglaries and deliberate injuries during the period. The deputy minister wrote that their number was increasing year over year because crimes went unsolved and perpetrators unpunished. Any trials that did actually occur went on for months, were sent back and forth between various courts, and eventually criminals were acquitted. For example, in August 1955, 56 tons of wheat were stolen from the Kirovabad flour mill. Due to the negligence of the city prosecutor's office and the Supreme Court of the Republic, consideration of the criminal case was suspended and the criminals were not punished. The report noted that Kirovabad was not unique in Azerbaijan in this respect, and that the criminal situation in the capital city of Baku was also tense.

The deputy minister highlighted that in 1955 and the first quarter of 1956, there were 278 cases of homicide, 237 rapes, 313 cases of grievous bodily harm, 347 extortions, numerous acts of hooliganism, and other crimes across the Azerbaijani

Republic. The report noted that in the first eight months of 1956 there were 46 instances of rape in the Republic's capital, often accompanied by severe bodily injuries. Conversations with local residents revealed a particular dissatisfaction with the local party and Soviet authorities' indifferent response to written and verbal complaints. A noteworthy aspect of the report was the attempts by some district party committee secretaries to identify anti-Soviet sentiments in citizens' complaints, forwarding these complaints to the KGB or the prosecutor's office, which resulted in the complainants themselves facing repercussions. Additionally, the report detailed those expressions of dissatisfaction or complaints within the kolkhozes led to complainants facing insults and violence. It documented 33 instances in which kolkhoz leadership resorted to violence against ordinary kolkhoz members. Leadership and their close associates often beat their underlings. The victims were ordinary kolkhoz members, while the perpetrators were identified as kolkhoz chairmen and brigade leaders.

The report also highlighted the apathetic response of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), the Prosecutor General's Office, and the Supreme Court of the Republic to complaints escalated to higher authorities. It noted that the Letters Department of the USSR Council of Ministers, in particular Imam Mustafaeyev and Sadykh Rahimov, failed to respond to communications concerning the criminogenic situation in the Republic. In the course of an investigation in Kirovabad, a contingent from the USSR MIA Chief Police Directorate along with the Republic's Police Directorate was deployed to reinforce public order in the city, complemented by military patrols from the local garrison. The report mentions that the city prosecutor, Aliyev, and investigator, Huseynov, were disciplined by the party for serious breaches of Soviet law, which led to investigations against several police officers. Following the commission's discoveries, a comprehensive meeting with representatives from the police, prosecutor's

office, and court personnel took place in Baku on 24 September 1956.

Imam Mustafayev's Response to Dudorov's Report

The investigation into the Bulokhova case in Kirovabad during the summer of 1956 prompted a review of the republic's law enforcement, party, and republic leadership activities. Dudorov's report, discussed at the CPSU Central Committee in October 1956 and long classified as "strictly confidential," highlighted that Imam Mustafayev's primary concern was not the escalating criminality within the republic but rather interethnic relationship. The report contained grievances from the Russian and Armenian communities in Kirovabad, outlined issues in interethnic relations and accused Azerbaijanis of exerting pressure and discrimination against other nationalities. Mustafayev did not voice opposition to the republic's criminogenic situation, the surge in criminal activities, or the local party and Soviet authorities' neglect of these illegalities, which in turn fostered an environment of lawlessness and arbitrariness. His personal accountability in these matters was deemed minimal. At the onset of this investigation, Mustafayev had been at the helm of the republic for slightly more than two years, while the majority of law enforcement personnel were hired during the previous Republican First Secretary Mirjafar Baghirov's tenure. The identified deficiencies were largely ascribed to the aftermath of Baghirov's rule.

The memoirs of Anatoliy Guskov, who chaired the Azerbaijan SSR State Security Committee from 1954 to 1956, document the connections between law enforcement personnel and the criminal underworld, including instances where officers themselves engaged in criminal activities.^[7] Guskov identified two key figures in this context. He noted that Colonel Karimov, head of the Baku city KGB, was a trusted confidant of Mirjafar Baghirov. He executed Baghirov's most confidential and clandestine operations. Karimov played a pivotal role in

fabricating charges with the help of criminal elements against Baghirov's adversaries. Ayyub Gasimov, the KGB chief in Kirovabad, was another such individual. According to Guskov, Gasimov had comprehensive knowledge of the illegal actions and misconduct of the republic's top officials, with which he blackmailed them to Mirjafar Baghirov's benefit. A significant case involved the prosecution of Professor Aliashraf Alizade and his wife with fabricated evidence.[\[8\]](#) Guskov emphasized the alarming frequency of these incidents and pointed out that the real problem was not just their occurrence, but also the protection afforded to law enforcement officers who had committed serious legal violations at the behest of the republic's high-ranking officials. This protection obstructed the firing and legal prosecution of senior law enforcement officials involved in criminal activities.

Another proof of the criminality of the republic's law-enforcement forces was the dismissal of Adil Babayev, the Prosecutor General in 1954, after Bagirov lost his high post in the party. Babayev accused of abuse of office, illegal detentions, unauthorized surveillance and wiretapping, and other unlawful acts and abuses of power. These unlawful actions were substantiated by the admissions of the head of the KGB, Fyodor Kopilov. Kopilov justified his approval of Prosecutor General Babayev's unlawful conduct by pointing to the dire criminogenic circumstances in the republic.[\[9\]](#) Kopilov justified his endorsement of Prosecutor General Babayev's unlawful conduct by pointing to the republic's dire criminogenic circumstances.

In Dudotov's report, Imam Mustafayev was not concerned about the illegal actions and arbitrariness of law enforcement agencies, but about what was written about interethnic relations. If we consider that the reason for Mustafayev's dismissal from his post was mistakes in the policy on nationalities, we can understand how important inter-ethnic relations were for him. The report detailed the adverse social conditions of the Russian and Armenian communities, the

monopolization of lucrative positions by Azerbaijanis, the disregard for their grievances, violence and sexual harassment against Russian women, and threats of murder for reporting to the police.[\[10\]](#) On 10 December 1956, at a Bureau meeting of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party in Baku attended by Dudorov and Yelichev, Mustafayev confronted the former, accusing him of wrongfully alleging discrimination by Azerbaijanis against other ethnic groups.[\[11\]](#) Mustafayev emphasized the harsh social conditions endured by both national minorities and Azerbaijanis, attributing these issues to the aftermath of war and the general social climate rather than to ethnic discrimination. He aimed to show that Azerbaijanis were not in a privileged social position by presenting employment data from Kirovabad's main industrial and commercial entities.[\[12\]](#) He argued that the statistics in Dudorov's report regarding violence against Azerbaijani women indicated that the perpetrators did not act out of ethnic hatred.

During Mustafayev's tenure, the deteriorating criminogenic situation across the republic was undeniable, as evidenced by incomplete reports from law enforcement agencies. These statistics, withheld from the public, revealed a particularly severe situation in the city of Baku. In the 1950s, Baku accounted for 57% of the crimes committed throughout the republic. The crime detection rate was alarmingly low, and the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies, especially the police, was lacking. The ineffectiveness of public organizations and the Komsomol in maintaining public order, coupled with the judicial system's issuance of unjust decisions in criminal cases, was repeatedly emphasized at high-level party meetings.[\[13\]](#)

The escalation of criminal activities in Baku was partly attributed to competition among various criminal factions. At the October 1956 meeting of the CPSU Bureau, the activities of these Baku criminal groups were closely examined. Reports underscored the intensified criminal atmosphere that resulted

from the rivalry between the faction led by Anvar Aghayev, nicknamed *Sary Anvar* (Yellow Anvar), and that led by Rahim Rahimov, nicknamed *Mehdi*, and Haji Zeynalov. Despite regular discussions at CPSU meetings regarding the rivalry and its severe consequences, efforts to apprehend these criminals were unsuccessful, largely because of the support these criminal gangs received from law enforcement agencies.

On 16 June 1958, Ali Karimov, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan SSR (ASSR), sent a report to Imam Mustafayev and Sadykh Rahimov on the completion of work related to combating crime in the republic. The report stated that 236 crimes were committed in Baku during the mentioned period, which comprised 48% of the crimes committed in the republic in May of that year. The most common crimes were theft and hooliganism. 71,5% of these crimes were related to looting of state property and 28,5% to thefts from apartments.[\[14\]](#) On 18 April 1958, Ali Karimov presented Imam Mustafayev a new “top secret” report on the fight against crime for the second quarter of 1958. According to the report, 1573 criminal cases were committed in the republic in the second quarter of 1958, of which 1412 (89,7%) were closed. Of the 1573 crimes committed, 762 were serious (48,4%). The report also noted that crime increased by 0,8% compared to the first quarter of 1958 and by 1,2% compared to the second quarter of 1957. Comparing the first quarter of 1958 with the first quarter of 1957, crime rose by 3,4%, while the increase in premeditated homicide in serious crimes was 35,5%. Another “top secret” report sent to Mustafayev on 23 October 1958 stated that in the 3rd quarter of 1958, there were 1644 crimes committed, and the number of particularly grave crimes (felonies) was 758. The minister noted that as a result of the improvement of operational agency work of the police during this period, it became somewhat easier to solve crimes.[\[15\]](#) One of the main factors complicating the solution of criminal cases was the inability of the police to utilize new advances in science and technology. During the mentioned period, only 4,6% of all

crimes were solved using modern technologies, and 12,5% of crimes were solved with the help of service dogs. These figures testified to the unprofessionalism of the police and non-transparent recruitment process. Organized crime became more widespread in the regions of the republic. Criminal groups usually consisted of 4-6 people. 1958 saw 234 more crimes than the previous year (4518 crimes were recorded in 1957 and 4752 crimes in 1958).

The report prepared for 1958 stated that 11855 people were convicted and 6420 crimes were committed in the republic. For comparison, it should be noted that the number of crimes committed in 1957 was 5996. In 1958, the republic saw 3027 homicides which was 503 crimes fewer compared to 1957. However, 412 serious criminal cases remained unsolved in 1958. The districts of Baku with the most crimes were Oktyabr, Narimanov and Kirov districts. A high crime rate was observed in Kirovabad city and Aghdam region. The shortcomings of law enforcement agencies—revealed in the report's detailing of crimes committed and the conduct of investigations, unfair accusations, imprisonment of innocent people or harsh punishments that could not be justified for minor offences—testified to serious flaws in the work of the judicial bodies as well.

At the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party held on 1 September 1964, measures to reduce particularly dangerous crimes in the republic were discussed, and the negligent activity of law enforcement agencies in this area was seriously criticized. It was noted at the meeting that in the first half of 1964, compared to 1963, the number of particularly dangerous crimes increased by 17,8%; premeditated homicide (murders) by 55%; infliction of serious bodily injuries by 40,2%; robberies by 35,7%, theft of state property by 27,4%; and theft of personal property by 13,7%. The reports submitted by law enforcement agencies to the republican central committee explained that the deterioration of the criminal situation in the republic

was a result of the low level of operational and investigative measures, violations of the law during investigation, unscrupulousness of judges and propensity to bribery in law enforcement agencies.[\[16\]](#) The prosecutor's office and investigative bodies often refused to open new criminal cases in order so that their crime resolution rate wasn't reduced. Participants in the meeting noted that the opening of a criminal case depended on the percentage of criminal cases solved. If the percentage of unsolved crimes was high, the police simply did not record new offenses. Because of the serious shortcomings noted at the meeting, the republic's prosecutor Seyfulla Akbarov was dismissed from his post the same year.[\[17\]](#)

In 1958, the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution to audit the work of republican courts. In the course of discussions with prisoners, the audit commission found out that judges had incorrectly set sentence terms. The prosecutor's office and the Supreme Court were recommended to take complaints about decisions seriously and, if necessary, appeal against judges' decisions. The report indicates that two shepherds from Zagatala were sentenced to 10 years in prison for stealing two sheep, although they returned the stolen sheep. In 1955, the Nakhchivan People's Court sentenced a Najaf Hajiyev to 11 years' imprisonment for stealing 606 grams of grain, although again Hajiyev had returned the stolen grain to the collective farm.[\[18\]](#) Interestingly, even the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan recognized that those perpetrators of serious crimes had gone unpunished, while minor crimes saw harsh punishments. However, no one wanted to investigate the reason why this had happened and no one was held responsible for it.

For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, Agababa Mikayilov, a member of the Supreme Court, addressed the practice of exempting people who had committed serious offenses from criminal liability and pointed out that judges were instead unjustly imprisoning people who did not pose a threat to

society. Mikayilov stated that the courts did not take strict measures against people engaged in speculation, did not properly investigate the ways of seizure of goods for speculation and added that speculators usually took advantage of the illegal actions of high-ranking officials. The real criminals, the high-ranking officials who had stolen state property and put it into the hands of speculators, were not held accountable; instead, they become even richer. However, courts had been silent about all this; officials had not been prosecuted.

Participants in the plenum of the Supreme Court held in November 1963 pointed out that judges had committed serious faults, violations of laws and procedural rules during the investigation and that judges in the regions had presided over cases illegally. These accusations were brought, in particular, against People's Judge Hashimov. Newspaper publications about the plenum instead denounced judges' irresponsible behavior because they interpreted the law and sentenced people according to their personal interests. At the plenum held in 1963, the President of the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan SSR Abdulla Ibrahimov also discussed the shortcomings of the courts in applying criminal punishments: He emphasized that some courts took decisions such as releasing people who had committed serious crimes or unjustly imprisoning them for a short period of time, which weakened the fight against crime.[\[19\]](#) Ibrahimov either did not realize that he was indirectly responsible for these decisions by failing to rein in lower court judges, or he wanted to claim that he was not authorized to take any actions against judges who had violated the laws.

On 7 January 1969, at the meeting of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, participants reported that the Central Committee received a large number of complaints from citizens related to law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and courts. Complaints mainly concerned illegal methods of investigation and unlawful arrests. Meeting

attendees noted that the number of law enforcement officers punished for offenses committed doubled in 1967 from the previous year. However, these punishments rarely included actual imprisonments and usually officials were just transferred to different stations. In 1968, a large number of law enforcement, prosecutorial and judicial personnel were subjected to administrative punishment. Participants at the bureau meeting also reported that law enforcement agencies treated citizens unprofessionally and ignored citizens' complaints about illegal court decisions.

In January 1968, Jabrayil district judge Akbarov was dismissed from his position for illegal activity and conduct unbecoming of a judge. This decision was the result of a number of complaints about Akbarov to the republican party central committee. The Supreme Court then sent a commission consisting of judges A. Aliyev and M. Karimov to Jabrayil to review the complaints. However, the commission gave a favorable opinion about the judge. At the January 1968 meeting the judges of the Supreme Court did not reveal why they decided to act against the commission's recommendation and remove Akbarov from his post. The Central Committee considered the case completed, though members noted that the Supreme Court had acted irresponsibly. [\[20\]](#)

The Ministry of the Interior and the Prosecutor General's Office submitted reports to the Central Committee, including detailed information about the perpetrators. The reports data makes clear that more than 90% of crimes in the republic were committed by workers and more than 35% of criminals were under 25 years old. The reports also reconfirmed the high crime rate among minors and young workers. [\[21\]](#)

Union-level inspection of the activities of Azerbaijani law enforcement agencies, repeated warnings and support provided by the center to strengthen the activities of law enforcement agencies since the mid-1950s had still not changed the situation by the late 1960s. On 19 November 1968, the Central

Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a decision *On Serious Shortcomings in the Activity of AzSSR Police and Measures to Strengthen Its Work*. The decision stated that republican law enforcement agencies had not made improvements despite the many criticisms. The official police reports about their activity acquitted law enforcement agencies and the MIA. The CC CPSU decision, however, stressed that the fight against crime had become weaker and notes that most serious crimes remained unsolved. The decision expressed special concern over the growth of crime in Baku; it stated that Baku accounted for 55% of crimes committed in the republic in 1968. It also noted that law enforcement agencies completely ignore crimes related to theft of state property and that the number and scale (rate) of thefts in ministries and state institutions increased every year. The decision states that in order to artificially lower the crime rate, officers of a number of law enforcement bodies refused to register criminal cases. The decision highlighted that the poor performance of law enforcement agencies is primarily due to poorly organized personnel policy, intrigues among law enforcement officials and an unhealthy working environment.[\[22\]](#) According to the decision of the CC, Minister Mammad Alizade and his deputies A. Rzayev and D. Rzayev were dismissed from their posts due to serious shortcomings, while deputies Kh. Janizade and T. Aliyev were reprimanded. B. Mehdiyev, head of the Internal Affairs Department of the Baku City Executive Committee, also lost his position.

Law enforcement agencies and authorities

Law enforcement agencies are considered critical infrastructure and a symbol of political power of countries. Law enforcement is not only a structure that ensures public order in a state and the normal mode of operation of state structures, but is also an instrument of political violence of the state. The state exercises a monopoly of violence against every part of society precisely through law enforcement agencies.

The relationship between politics and violence is one of the most pressing issues in contemporary political and social theories. The records of the law enforcement offices to the authorities of the Soviet Azerbaijan are intended to show how deep the links between law enforcement agencies and the authorities are. These links show that the leadership of law enforcement agencies in any state is not apolitical and corresponds to the behavior and style of governance of the authorities. Even though in Soviet times the work of law enforcement agencies in Azerbaijan was repeatedly criticized at the highest level, none of the leading structures of law enforcement agencies received real punishment for lawlessness, criminal acts, arbitrariness, and there was no change to the work of law enforcement agencies between 1956 and 1968.

[1] Hannah Arendt. Zorakılıq haqqında. Tinay Müşdiyevanın tərcuməsi.

<https://bakuresearchinstitute.org/hannah-arendt-zorakiliq-haqq-inda/>. Əldə edilib 13 iyul 2024.

[2] Arendt, Hannah. "Zorakılıq haqqında (ikinci hissə)." Tərcüməçi: Tinay Mushdiyeva. *Baku Research Institute*, June 30, 2022.

<https://bakuresearchinstitute.org/hannah-arendt-zorakiliq-haqq-inda-2/>

[3] Jock Young. *The exclusive society: Social exclusion, crime, and difference in late modernity*. SAGE Publication Ltd. 2007.

[4] After several months of this investigation Dudorov was appointed the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

[5] Президиум ЦК КПСС 1954–1964. Том 2. Постановления 1954–1958. М.: РОССПЭН, 2015, ss.433-443, Source: Российский Государственный Архив Новейшей Истории (РГАНИ) Ф. 3. Оп. 12. Д. 119. Л. 93–106.

[6] The documents contain only the surnames of the victims of the crime.

[7] A.M.Guskom: Under the stamp of truth. Confession of a military counterintelligence officer. People. Facts. Special operations. "strictly personal", http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/guskov_am01/guskov_am01.html, 8 July 2024.

[8] Dr. Aliashraf Alizadeh, Ph.D. in Geology and Mineralogy, held the position of the Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party from 1944 to 1946.

[9] Meeting of the Bureau of Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party. Archive of Public Political Documents of the Administration of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (APPDAPA), fund 1, list 46, case 113, pages 1-9.

[10] Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, p.440.

[11] Meeting of the Bureau of Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party APPDAPA, f.1, list.43, case 107, p.249-253.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Meeting of the Bureau of Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party APPDAPA, f.1, list 43, case 107, p.3-248.

[14] Report of Minister of Internal Affairs Ali Karimov to Central Committee (MK). State Archive of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ARDA), chapter 411, list 34, case 4, p. 257.

[15] Report of Minister of Internal Affairs to CC (MK). ARDA, ch. 411, list 34, case 16. pp. 89-123.

[16] Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of Azerbaijan Communist Party. ARPIIISSA, ch.1, list 51, case 55,

pp. 198-203.

[\[17\]](#) Meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of Azerbaijan Communist Party. ARPIIISSA, ch.1, list 51, case 318, pp. 4-6.

[\[18\]](#) Meeting of the Bureau of the Central Committee of Azerbaijan Communist Party. State Archive of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ARDA), ch. 411, list 34, case 4, pp.192-193.

[\[19\]](#) Plenum of the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan SSR, ARDA, ch.411, list 34, case 4, p.195.

[\[20\]](#) Meeting of the Bureau of the Central Committee of Azerbaijan Communist Party. ARPIIISSA, ch.1, list 56, case 15, 7-8.

[\[21\]](#) Report sent by Minister of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan SSR A. Karimov to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of ASSR. ARDA, ch.411, list 34. case 66, p. 69.

[\[22\]](#) Meeting of the Bureau of the Central Committee of Azerbaijan Communist Party. ARPIIIIISSA, ch.1, list 56, case 71, pp. 7-10.