The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia has been ongoing for over 30 years and appears to be coming to a head. Following the Azerbaijani army’s local anti-terrorism operation at the end of September, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, discussed the integration of the Armenian community of Karabakh into Azerbaijan’s state and society. However, both communities’ representatives emphasize that the loss of life and destruction of the military conflicts will make integration impossible. The casualties of war are not the sole impediment to the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities’ integration. A more serious obstacle to this integration is the longstanding memory policies of both governments. This paper analyzes the mechanisms of the emergence and spread of narratives of pain. These narratives depict human tragedy, dangerous memories of historical trauma. The basis of the analysis is the creation and legitimation of narratives related to the March events and Khojaly tragedy. We employ deconstructionist approach as a theoretical basis for this study.
Many scholars who have studied history agree that the past and history are not the same thing. The way in which the past is constructed, reconstructed, and deconstructed is a subject of much debate. Keith Jenkins and Alun Munslow argue in their book The Nature of History Reader that “the past is behind us, but histories are always yet to come.”[1] The way history is constructed and interpreted depends on how historians perceive primary sources and the facts derived from them. Written history is often incomplete and biased towards the present. There are multiple versions of history, depending on the historian’s perspective. This paper acknowledges that historiography’s approach of deconstructing the past does not eliminate the distinction between appearance and reality since our only way of accessing the past is through historical documentation.
The nature of history is complex, and its relationship with the past raises many questions about how modern society’s needs and aspirations are determined and how the past should be interpreted and commemorated. Studies on the relationship between past and present usually focus on how politics utilize history for political and ideological purposes, a process that is typically initiated from the top. In this paper, my objective is to examine how the process is initiated from the bottom up or how individual narratives shape history within instrumentalized historiography. While doing so, I acknowledge that individual narratives cannot be conceptualized and studied until they meet the needs of politics and national historiography.
During my travel to the Terter region of Azerbaijan in July 2022, I had the opportunity to get information about the local population’s perception of the neighboring Armenian community in the Karabakh region. This was in the aftermath of the military conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the autumn of 2020. During the 44-day military conflict, Terter was severely affected by continuous Armenian artillery shelling, according to officials. Those who shared their opinions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations expressed exclusively positive views towards the Armenian people. On September 12th-13th, an escalation occurred along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, which was far away from the conflict zone. Almost a month after this event, I had the opportunity to observe the perceptions and opinions of the younger generation, specifically university students, regarding the same questions. Unlike the older generation, this generation has never lived alongside any member of the Armenian community. As a result, they have completely negative attitudes towards Armenians. My paper does not aim to conduct a comparative analysis of how the older and younger generations in modern Azerbaijan perceive Armenia and Armenians. Rather, I aim to explore how different spoken and written sources contribute to the construction of personal narratives of pain that fuel anti-Armenian sentiments in society.
The aim is to analyze the interpretation of two tragic events that occurred in the 20th century, namely March 1918 and February 1992. The main question addressed in this paper is how oral narratives from eyewitnesses relate to written history, and how historians use the context and content of these narratives to deconstruct the past. To explore the relationship between official and personal narratives, we used a combination of descriptive-comparative and quantitative methods. To begin, we analyzed two written sources—media outlets and national historiography. For this study, we analyzed school curricula and textbooks that were printed and circulated between 1994 and 2014. These materials are important parts of the national historiography. We also examined two media outlets — Azadliq and Azerbaijan (from 1994 to 2003, January-March)—to investigate their role in deconstructing the past.
A survey was conducted to understand how the official historiography interpreted the content of oral narratives that shaped the perceptions of young generations regarding Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. The survey had 54 undergraduate participants from one of Azerbaijan’s state universities. The average age of the students was 20 years old, and the study included 33 male and 21 female students. The students belonged to different regions of Azerbaijan, and ten out of 54 clearly self-reported a non-Turkic ethnic identity. The survey consisted of three sets of questions. The first set was aimed at gauging the level of obedience among the students. We used some questions from Adorno’s measurement of the authoritarian personality for this purpose. The second set of questions was designed to determine the extent of nationalism among the students. Finally, the third set included open-ended questions and narratives to understand students’ perceptions of Armenia and Armenians.
Sadness and Disappointments
During the 1905 Russian Revolution, there was a violent conflict between the Armenian and Muslim communities in the Baku and Elizavetpol gubernias of the Russian Empire. However, the interpretation of these events is disputed by Azerbaijani and Armenian historians. Thirteen years later, in March 1918, there was another significant military clash between the two neighboring nations. This occurred when the Bolsheviks in Baku tried to take political control of the city. The city’s political conflict escalated into an ethnic clash, influenced by the political affiliations of the city’s main ethnic groups, namely Russians, Armenians, and Turk Azerbaijanis. The Baku Soviet had only managed to hold onto power for a few months before being ousted by the Centrocaspian Dictatorship. In September 1918, Ottoman forces captured the city, leading to renewed tension between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
After the Bolsheviks took over the Russians’ imperial capital, three South Caucasian nations declared their independence about six months later. During the Russian Civil War, these nations struggled to establish their geographical borders. In the region, there were approximately twelve disputed provinces, eight of which directly affected Azerbaijan and Armenia’s political interests. These provinces, namely Zangezur, Gazakh, Karabakh, Kars, Batum, Nakhchivan, Sharur, and Daralayaz, had mixed Armenian-Turk Azerbaijani or Armenian-Turk Azerbaijani-Kurdish-Georgian populations.
When the Red Army of Soviet Russia invaded the South Caucasus nation-states, Armenians and Azerbaijanis were still fighting for their own perceived borders. Only a few territorial disputes had been successfully resolved. The military confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan could not be ended until the Bolsheviks occupied the capital cities of both nations. Although both Armenians and Azerbaijanis agree that the Soviet presence brought stability and safety to the region, not everyone was pleased with the decisions taken to ensure stability and resolve territorial disputes. Azerbaijanis appeared to be more content than Armenians. When a new historical atlas of Azerbaijan was released in the 1950s, Armenian historians expressed their dissatisfaction. Based on medieval Armenian written sources, historians from Soviet Armenia accused their Azerbaijani colleagues of falsifying history.[2] This was the first time that the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation had been elevated from the battlefield to the realm of scientific inquiry.
The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic was a significant source of dissatisfaction for Armenia, as its political leadership repeatedly requested a revision of its territorial status. However, the Kremlin refused, stating that all land in the Soviet Union belonged to the government, not a specific nation. As the Soviet government weakened and lost control over its territories in the late 1980s, various nations asserted their rights to lands that held significant meaning for them. This led to local conflicts in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which eventually escalated into a prolonged and violent war between the two Caucasian nations.
When national historians joined the conflict, hostility intensified. The battle of scholars was promoted by the political establishment. On March 26, 1998, then-president of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev signed a decree On the genocide of Azerbaijanis.[3] That same year the Azerbaijani government started a campaign for international recognition and commemoration of the Khojaly tragedy. In 2007 the Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan recognized the Khojaly tragedy as a genocide against Azerbaijanis.
Writing National History in the Nation-State
Understanding the political and ideological context of official historiography requires an examination of the relationship between past and academic history. To achieve this, we must consider two crucial points: firstly, how historians approach the content of primary sources, particularly the oral legacy that has been passed down through local communities and is now a topic of historical interpretation;[4] and secondly, their ability to interpret the historical past within its temporal context. Therefore, it is essential to comprehend the role that archival sources and oral narratives of eyewitnesses play in the deconstruction of the past.
The first school curricula of independent Azerbaijan were introduced in the mid-1990s. In 1995, the textbook History of Azerbaijan for 11th grade was published, covering 20th-century history.[5] The book was written by leading scholars from Azerbaijan State University (now known as Baku State University). In the introduction, the scholars indicated that “the main purpose of studying history is to strengthen the independent state of Azerbaijan, enhance spiritual development, and foster national consciousness and patriotic feelings among the population.”[6]
Three years later, researchers from the Institute of History of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences published the first volume of a seven-volume series titled History of Azerbaijan. The three volumes of this series that covered 20th-century history were published in 2001 and 2003 respectively.[7] According to the authors, “the aim of this study is to comprehensively research the contradictory problems of the 20th century’s history.”[8]
During the Russian Imperial period and after the fall of the Romanov Empire, there were several clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Soviet historiography claimed that these were a result of class confrontations, rather than an ethnic background. However, the national historians of Azerbaijan under independence must now prove that this interpretation was unreliable. The 1995 school textbook presented the decisive military confrontation between the Bolsheviks and Musavat Party members in March 1918 as “a genocide of Azerbaijanis.”[9] The chapter on this conflict was written by Jamil Hasanli, a prominent Azerbaijani historian who is currently an active opponent of President Ilham Aliyev. Hasanli’s arguments are based on two points: firstly, he argues that Armenians and Bolsheviks wanted to eliminate social support for Muslim politicians, particularly Musavat; secondly, he claims that Armenians aimed to make Baku a non-Muslim city and then occupy the whole of Azerbaijan. Hasanli acknowledges that the political rivalry between Azerbaijanis and Armenians turned into ethnic hostility when Armenian Dashnaktsutyun, a national socialist party, supported Bolshevik Shaumian instead of nationalist Musavat. According to Hasanli around 12.000 Azerbaijanis were killed in a three-day clash in Baku.
In the year 2000, a new history textbook was published for 11th-grade students.[10] The book contained new information about the March 1918 clashes between the Bolsheviks and Dashnaktsutyun members against Musavat, and about the February 1992 Khojaly tragedy.[11] According to the book, during the March clashes, the total number of Muslim casualties was fifty thousand, with 12 thousand in Baku alone. The March clashes led to the burning and destruction of many historic and cultural buildings in Baku. The book was based mainly on archival sources such as the files of the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry, which was created by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal Affairs to investigate the violence committed against Muslims and their property across Transcaucasia since the start of the European War.[12] Regarding the Khojaly tragedy, the book cites information released by the republican prosecutor’s office, which indicates that Armenian-Russian united military brigades killed 613 civilians, injured 489, and captured 1.275.
In 2013, the schoolchildren were introduced to new textbooks. The March 1918 events, which were previously known as the genocide organized by Armenian Dashnaktsutyun, now introduced as Baku Soviet’s genocide of Azerbaijanis. The Khojaly tragedy was presented with a more emotional narrative.[13] Scholars from the Institute of History of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences offered an understanding of the military confrontation that took place in March 1918 similar to that of previous years. The authors suggested that “Armenians struggled to eliminate the social support of the Musavat Party to realize their imagined ‘Great Armenia.'”[14] The researchers described “Armenian atrocities” and referred to archival sources, concluding that “12.000 Azerbaijanis lost their lives as counter-revolutionary elements” during the three-day confrontation.[15]
When it comes to the March events and the Khojaly tragedy, there were no significant disparities between the school curricula and academic publications by the Institute of History. Scholars who provided an in-depth analysis of the Khojaly tragedy named the perpetrators and criticized the “political leadership’s criminal negligence” for ignoring appeals for military assistance from the local population and military self-defense groups.[16] In general, school curricula and scholarly research had similar content and context, telling the same story with the same interpretation and relying on the same primary sources. National scholars declared that they accurately represented truthful information from primary sources. However, the origin of these primary sources is not clear.
Media as a Storyteller
According to Andrew Barash’s Collective Memory and Historical Past, mass media has the power to make events visible to the public and shape the way people remember them.[17] This often results in a gap between the historical facts and how they are remembered. When official historical narratives are rejected by society for political or ideological reasons, media becomes a powerful tool for shaping collective memory. This is especially true for societies that lack experience with democracy and have been under authoritarian regimes for a long time, as in the case of Azerbaijan as a former Soviet state. The continuous interaction between mass media’s interpretation of the past and society’s remembrance of it increases the likelihood of historical mythologies being propagated.
The circulation of information about the March events of 1918 in media outlets began in the early 1990s, when the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict intensified due to the refugees from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The first independent narratives about the Khojaly tragedy emerged in 1996. The two types of media, official Azərbaycan and opposition Azadlıq, provide insight into how the viewpoints and positions of different parts of society contribute to the construction of history. Each year between March 29-31, both media outlets shed light on the events of March 1918 through commemoration and publication for mass audiences of scholarly findings. However, in 1998, this tradition was broken when a series of articles was published by Azərbaycan in February and March.[18] That same year, Heydar Aliyev signed a decree on the Genocide of Azerbaijanis. The author of these articles was Atakhan Pashayev, a historian by background and the head of the National Archives of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Jamil Hasanli wrote a series of articles for opposition Azadlig.[19] Both media interpretations were similar and supported by written and visual documentation.
The Khojaly case has been covered by both official and opposition media, but with different perspectives. Surkhay Huseynli was the main interpreter of the Khojaly events from 1994 to 1998 in Azadliq, but his interpretation was more politically motivated than historical. Huseynli blamed the political and military leaders of Azerbaijan for what happened in Khojaly.[20] In the early 21st century, Azadliq introduced a new approach to the Khojaly tragedy. The newspaper shared information about commemoration events, urged opposition leaders to be more active during days of Khojaly commemoration, and called on parliament to recognize the tragedy as a genocide.[21]
Azadliq itself preferred to use the term “tragedy” instead of “genocide” when interpreting the Khojaly events. During the 1990s, it criticized the political leadership and military leaders of the republic, especially then-president Ayaz Mutalibov, in harsh terms. However, Heydar Aliyev’s presidency of seven years significantly changed the opposition newspaper’s position. The newspaper now stated that “although Mutalibov was the president at the time and responsible for the safety of the citizens, he was not the only person responsible for the events in Khojaly. We need a thorough investigation to find the real culprits.”[22] The newspaper was also disappointed with the extent of the state’s campaign to disseminate information about the Khojaly tragedy. According to the newspaper’s 2002 report, “the people on the streets of Baku have no idea what happened in Khojaly in February 1992,” and the Nizami cinema hall was completely empty when a documentary on the Khojaly tragedy was shown.”[23]
In the first two years after the Khojaly tragedy, the official stance of Azərbaycan was to avoid political interpretations and instead focus on the factual aspects of the event. However, from 1995 onwards, Heydar Aliyev emerged as a leading figure in interpreting and commemorating the tragedy. Azərbaycan highlighted Aliyev’s speeches made at the Taza Pir Mosque, as well as his meetings with representatives of the former Khojaly residents. On the fifth anniversary of the tragedy, Azərbaycan reported that the city’s defenders had been awarded by the president. Among those awarded was Elman Mammadov, the mayor of the district, who had previously been accused by Azadliq of mismanagement and misuse of his power.
From 1999, Azerbaijan began to publish more information regarding the Khojaly tragedy. The newspaper usually featured Heydar Aliyev’s address to the nation, parliament’s appeals to other parliaments around the world and international organizations, chronicles of the events, reports, and special investigations that generally took up the front pages.[24] The authors of these pieces were typically members of the political elite and intelligentsia, some of whom were originally from Khojaly, but not eyewitnesses themselves. Rather, they shared the stories of their relatives and family members.[25] The first visual sources of the tragedy were not available until 2000, when the number of publications related to the tragedy increased significantly.
Figure 1. The number of publications on the Khojaly tragedy in Azadlıq and Azərbaycan
Narratives of the Khojaly tragedy began to appear in official media in 1996. Among the first storytellers of the tragedy were national hero of Azerbaijan Allahverdi Baghirov;[26] head of the Khojaly district Police Department Sadiq Madatov, policeman Shahid Muradov; deputy mayor Goyush Hasanov; the first secretary of the Khojaly city organization of the Azerbaijani Youth Union Elchin Abishov; and other representatives of the local administration.[27] Ordinary people’s testimonies were published in the February 1998 issues of Azərbaycan.[28] In most cases, these narratives simply repeated what officials of the region, members of the political establishment, and intelligentsia had voiced several years earlier. These narratives were later used as eyewitness testimonies by scholars from the Institute of History of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences to interpret the Khojaly tragedy.
Between Present and Past: Deconstructing Narratives of Pain
The impact of historical events that resulted in significant changes can never be forgotten in the lives of societies. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan during the 20th century is one of those tragedies that have left an indelible mark on both peoples. Sharing memories of the past do not just transmit traumatic feelings from the past, but also link the experiences of the past with current issues that shape ethnic identity and the content of Azerbaijani official national ideology. Narratives of pain that recount the memory of tragedy can be a powerful tool for national consolidation. These narratives of pain are included in the history curriculum and are an essential component of controlling an individual’s memory and perceptions. This study aims to understand students’ awareness of the role of memory, specifically the narratives of pain in their political context.
From October to November 2022, fourth-year students studying history at one the Azerbaijani universities. were asked to participate in surveys consisting of three sets of questions. In the first stage, the students were asked to answer four questions. These questions were: 1. Can you make independent decisions about your life? 2. Have your parents influenced your career choice? 3. If favorable economic conditions existed in the country, would you prefer to start your own business instead of going to university? 4. If you had the financial opportunity, would you prefer to live separately from your family?
The questions assess how independent students believe they are in making decisions. The answer options were yes or no. Out of the total number of students surveyed (N=54), 61,1% or 31 students believe they are independent individuals. However, 44 students (81,4%) confirmed that their career choice made by their parents. Additionally, 32 students expressed their willingness to start their own businesses provided favorable conditions. Only 23 students (42,9%) would choose to live apart from their families if they had the financial means to do so. Interestingly, the majority of these students were women (15 out of 23).
In the second stage, the survey questions were designed to assess the degree of nationalism among the students. The students were asked to answer the following questions: 1. Are you proud to be Azerbaijani? 2. Do you agree that Azerbaijan is the greatest country in the world? 3. Would you support ethnic cleansing to protect your own nation? 4. Would you put your nation before your family? 5. Do you think your nation is perfect? 6. Do you support antisemitism? 7. Do you believe the ethnic minorities face problems in Azerbaijan? 8. Do you respect people of other religions? 9. “Do you think people need to be judged according to their ethnic identity and religious beliefs?
More than 80% of respondents confirmed their pride in being Azerbaijani. However, none supported the idea of Azerbaijan being the greatest country in the world. 48 students believed that ethnic cleansing is the wrong policy to protect their nation, 6 students’ answer was ‘yes’, and all 54 agreed that their family comes first. According to a survey, the majority of respondents (88,8%, n=48) expressed a negative attitude towards antisemitism and agreed that their nation is not perfect. Out of 54 students, only 6 (11,1%) believed that national minorities face issues in Azerbaijan. Additionally, 4 students (7,4%) stated that they would not respect people from other religions. On the other hand, 48 respondents agreed that people should not be judged based on their ethnic identity or religious affiliation.
I also discussed the perspectives of Azerbaijani students towards Armenia and Armenians. The first two segments contained closed-ended questions, while the last round was an open-ended inquiry. The students were asked four open-ended questions: 1. “Where do you usually obtain information about Armenia and Armenians?” 2. “What are some positive qualities that Armenians possess?” 3. “What are some negative traits that Armenians possess?” and 4. “What are some recollections of Armenians that you have?” It is important to note that the younger generation in Azerbaijan has no direct interaction with members of the Armenian community, nor do they have any experience of peaceful coexistence.
Out of fifty-four respondents, twenty-four confirmed that they got their information about Armenia mainly from the media. Fifteen students indicated that they learned about Armenia from their school’s history curricula, and another fifteen respondents pointed to their family members’ experiences as crucial sources of information. When it comes to Armenian people’s positive characteristics, respondents used the following statements: “They are true patriots and countrymen”; “Peaceful and philanthropic people”; “Good craftsmen”; and “Skillful politicians.” According to Azerbaijani students, “ignorant” and “brutal” were the major negative traits of Armenians. The complicated image of Armenians is the result of a combination of the echoes of the past and reflections of the present.
During the activity, the students were asked to share narratives they have heard from their family members about the Armenian community. Students who belonged to families that had lived alongside the Armenian community for a long time, such as children of refugees from Armenia and internally displaced people from the Karabakh region, mostly shared positive impressions about Armenians. On the other hand, students who had no prior connection with the Armenian community shared negative views.
Three students from different districts of Azerbaijan shared their personal experiences and memories related to the conflict. One student from Aghsu district talked about her great-grandmother’s experience during the March events of 1918. Another student from Lachin district recalled the stories of her close relatives who were combatants in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in the early 1990s and also in the 2020 war. The third student, who was from the Hachiqabul district, explained how her school held a Khojaly commemoration every year in February and how it influenced her perception of Armenians. She was surprised to hear good things about Armenians from her classmates’ family members, despite the negative portrayal of Armenians in her school’s commemoration. She also mentioned that she was shocked to hear about the brutality of Azerbaijani soldiers during the military confrontation.
When presenting events of the past in historical narratives and media outlets, those who create history acknowledge that the past itself is not inherently “historical” and must be transformed into history through the works of historians.
Conclusion
This paper has explored how oral narratives are used to contextualize and conceptualize written history. To achieve this goal, I examined official historiography and media outlets as principal sources of written history, focusing on narratives of pain that attracted Azerbaijani society’s perceptions of the historical events of March 1918 and February 1992. Both events are recognized as genocide by the political establishment and are considered tragedies in the 20th-century Azerbaijani history. The temporal remoteness of the March 1918 events created favorable conditions for official historiography’s monopolization of its interpretation. However, this is not true for the Khojaly tragedy. The first accounts of the Khojaly tragedy in the media were not a classical example of past remains/oral narratives that passed from person to person. Instead, the representatives of power initially told the story through mass media technologies, and it subsequently became a part of the official historiography through exchange and exemplification.
It took almost eight years for the Khojaly tragedy to be commemorated in novels and other genres. These stories focused on personal pain, loss, and sadness, rather than targeting Armenia as an enemy country or Armenians as an enemy nation. Instead, they shared stories of individual experiences of being insulted and humiliated. By weaving in historical accounts, these novels of human suffering became powerful sources of intra-ethnic solidarity.
The results of the surveys confirm that the stories of suffering, which were widely circulated through textbooks and scholarly works promote hatred, violence, and militaristic ideas, and offer little hope for future cooperation between nations.
Notes and references:
[1]The Nature of History Reader. 2004. Edited by Keith Jenkins and Alun Munslow. London and New York: Routledge, Introduction, 3.
[2] Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidenti İşlər İdarəsi İctimai-Siyasi Sənədlər Arxivi, f.1, siy.53, iş 36, v.123-128
[3]Azərbaycanlıların soyqırımı haqqında. Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin Fərmanı, https://e-qanun.az/framework/4684. Accessed September 27 2023.
[4] Barash J.A. 2006. Collective memory and historical past, The University of Chicago Press, 26.
[5] Azərbaycan tarixi. 1995. 11-ci sinif üçün dərslik. Bakı: Öyrətmən.
[6] Ibid., 3.
[7] Azərbaycan tarixi, 2001. 5-ci və 6-cild; 2003. 7-ci cild. Bakı: Elm.
[8] Azərbaycan tarixi. 2001. 6-ci cild, Introduction, 5.
[9] Azərbaycan tarixi.1995. Bakı: Öyrətmən, 9-12.
[10] Azərbaycan tarixi, 2000. 11-ci sinif üçün dərslik. Bakı: Çaşıoğlu.
[11] Ibid., 11-14, 292.
[12] Azərbaycan Respublikasının Dövlət Arxivi, fond 1061, siyahı 1, iş 95.
[13] Azərbaycan tarixi, 2014, Bakı: Çaşıoğlu, p.10-11, 164-166.
[14] Azərbaycan tarixi.2001. 5-ci cild. Bakı: Elm, 246-247.
[15] Ibid., 247.
[16] Azərbaycan tarixi, 2003. Bakı: Elm, 7-ci cild, 243-244.
[17] Barash, 115.
[18] Bakıda 1918-ci il mart faciəsi, Azərbaycan, 27.02.1998; Şamaxı faciəsi, Azərbaycan, 15.03.1998.
[19] 1918-ci ilin martı Azərbaycanda türk-müsəlman soyqırımı, Azadlıq, 31.03.1998; 31 Mart soyqırımından 85 il keçir, Azadlıq, 29-31 mart, 2003.
[20] Xocalı: faciənin görünən və görünməyən günahkarları, Azadlıq, 17-26. 02. 1994; Xocalı: Qan verən yara və günaha batdığımız 3 il, Azadlıq, 25.02.1995; Xocalı: Qana bulanmış siyasi oyunlar və günahsızlıq yarışı, Azadlıq, 26.02.1997.
[21] Xocalı faciəsi, Azadlıq, 27.02.2002; Xocalıdan kecən on il, Azadlıq, 27.02.2002; Xocalıdan 11 il keçir, Azadlıq, 26.02.2003.
[22] Xocalı faciəsi: Kimdir günahkar? Azadlıq, 28.02.2002.
[23] Xocalı faciəsini necə xatırlayırıq? Azadlıq, 27.02.2002.
[24] Xocalı soyqırımı bəşəriyyət tarixində ağır bir cinayət kimi qalacaqdır. Azərbaycan, 27.02.1995; Xocalı soyqırımının qurbanlarının xatirəsi qəlbimizdə əbədi yaşayacqdır. Azərbaycan,28.02.1995.
[25] Xocalının qəhrəmanlıq salnaməsi, Azərbaycan, 25.02.1999; Xocalı: Azərbaycanlılara qarşı genosid siyasətinin tərkib hissəsi, Azərbaycan, 22.02.2002.
[26] According to the official information, he was a key person in the Khojaly hostages’ negotiations.
[27] Qanlı dərs: Xocalı faciəsindən 4 il keçir, Azərbaycan, 24.02.1996; Şahidlərin gözü ilə, Azərbaycan, 26.02.1997.
[28] Göy üzünə yazılmış ağrı, Azərbaycan, 26.02.1998.
