In Azerbaijan, discussions periodically emerge on social media regarding the relations between urban residents and newcomers, or between urban residents and villagers, and these discussions often result in aggressive debates. These debates inevitably draw attention to the causes of migration from Azerbaijani villages to cities. One of the main reasons for this migration flow is mass unemployment in the provinces. People move to Baku and other cities of the country believing that the labor market is broader and the demand for labor is higher there. Among these cities, Baku’s prominence is not only related to social factors but also to the factors that make the capital attractive for the younger generation.
Indeed, urban life is more convenient and comfortable compared to rural life. However, those who create this comfort are not the residents of cities but the government. The infrastructure of cities and provinces differs less in developed countries because states make sure that the infrastructure required to meet societal requirements is built in both urban and rural areas, bringing urban and rural lives closer together. However, such a tendency did not exist either in the Russian Empire or in Soviet Azerbaijan.
Until the 1970s, the majority of Baku’s population consisted not of Azerbaijanis (46,3%), but of representatives of other nationalities (53,7%).[1] The influx of Azerbaijanis from the provinces to Baku began somewhat after the Second World War, in the early 1950s. The main reason for this was the need for cheap labor associated with the large-scale construction and reconstruction projects organized after the war. In this article, I will analyze the factors that accelerated migration from the regions to the cities starting from the 1950s and the reasons for the tensions that emerged between urban residents and newcomers. To do this, I will first examine the social situation of Azerbaijani villages in the mid-twentieth century and then present the results of interviews I conducted with people who migrated from the provinces to Baku after the Second World War. This analysis will make it possible to determine why provincial residents who moved to cities beginning in the 1950s left their homes and will also help answer some of the questions raised today regarding relations between locals and newcomers, and between urban residents and villagers.
By “urban residents,” I refer to Azerbaijanis who moved to Baku from various parts of the empire in the early twentieth century for different reasons, and who, after the establishment of Soviet power, migrated from the provinces of the Azerbaijan SSR to cities. I present the words urban and rural in italics because of the changeable nature of this social status. Since one of the oldest occupation of humans is agriculture, everyone’s origin is connected to the countryside. For certain reasons, a group of people later engaged in occupations associated with urban life (trade, science, art, industry), thereby losing their rural status and transitioning to urban status.
In this article, by the city of Baku I mean the administrative territory recorded in official documents and statistical materials during the Soviet period, that is, the administrative territory that did not include urban-type settlements subordinate to the Baku City Soviet. Between 1958 and 1965, the city of Baku administratively included 13 districts; in 1965, the territories of some of these districts were merged, and the city came to consist of 11 districts. In this article, the term Azerbaijani refers to the term used in Soviet documents and statistical sources. This term was applied to the population living in the territory of Azerbaijan who considered Azerbaijani their native language. In 1959, this term also included assimilated Tats, Talysh, and Kurds. It should be noted that in the 1959 census, non-assimilated Kurds and Talysh were recorded separately. However, in the statistical materials of 1970 and 1979, Tats and Talysh were no longer recorded as ethnic groups, and the number of non-assimilated Kurds had decreased significantly. Thus, in this article, the term Azerbaijani refers to Turkic-speaking Azerbaijanis who consider Azerbaijani their native language, as well as assimilated Tats, Kurds, and Talysh.
A brief historical overview of the twentieth-century Azerbaijani village
In Azerbaijani public discourse, there exists a mistaken belief that the country’s geographical location, natural conditions, and climate are favorable for the development of agriculture.[2] Historically, Azerbaijan has been considered one of the regions not particularly suitable for the development of the agrarian sector. The population living in mountainous areas was mainly engaged in animal husbandry, while those living in lowland regions cultivated various agricultural products. However, since the population could not fully supply itself with agricultural products, some of these products were always imported. Based on these facts, it could have been predicted that Soviet agrarian reforms would lead to a decline in labor productivity and mass unemployment in Azerbaijan, and this prediction proved accurate.
Although the Soviet government promised land and freedom to peasants, with the establishment of Soviet rule peasants were deprived of the land and partial freedom they had enjoyed during the imperial period. In the early years of Soviet rule, aggressive agrarian policies resulted in the confiscation of land previously given to peasants under the pretext of establishing collective farms (kolkhozes), the deprivation of peasants of identity documents, and their effective transformation into a serf-like condition. The arbitrariness of collective farm chairmen, the destruction of middle peasants labeled as kulaks (through confiscation of property and exile), unwarranted interference in the private lives of peasants, and anti-religious campaigns in religious provincial areas completely damaged relations between the authorities and the peasantry in the 1930s. Resistance to Soviet rule in the provinces sometimes resulted in entire villages being collectively punished. During the repression period of 1936–1939, mass executions and long-term imprisonments of people arrested on fabricated charges were widely practiced in the provinces. On 31 December 1937, in Ismayilli, 63 people were arrested and executed by a troika, a mobile court, of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs as members of a “counter-revolutionary insurgent organization.” Such mobile courts were organized in almost all regions of Azerbaijan.[3]
The disasters brought by the Second World War, the military mobilization of men who constituted the main labor force, the confiscation of draft animals for the benefit of the state, and famine temporarily brought together different social strata in the countryside—state officials, party workers, and ordinary peasants. It was necessary to unite forces to fight existing problems, and peasants preferred cooperation with the authorities rather than conflict. Unfortunately, after the war ended, Soviet agrarian policy once again did not align with the interests of the peasants. The provinces of Azerbaijan saw no improvement during the first thirty years of Soviet rule; on the contrary, the authorities dealt a serious blow to traditional social relations existing in the provinces. The mass repressions of the 1930s and the tragedies brought by the Second World War also played a certain role in these processes.
Although Azerbaijan did not become a battlefield during World War II, 58.000 Azerbaijanis lost their lives in the war[4] (in the first year of WWII there were 39.319 Azerbaijanis in the ranks of the Soviet army, and in the final year 56.989[5]), and 20.850 people were taken prisoner.[6] The fate of children made fatherless by the war was often tragic. When their mothers remarried, the children were usually left under the care of grandparents or close relatives or were sent to orphanages. In many cases, children who initially stayed with their grandparents were later also sent to orphanages. Famine did not allow relatives to raise these children, and they were forced to relinquish them to the state. Sometimes children ran away from home to escape violence from relatives and were later picked up from the streets and sent to orphanages. In orphanages, hunger, unsanitary conditions, physical and sexual violence, and arbitrariness were widespread.[7] It is therefore not accidental that once they reached adulthood, these children moved not to their native homes or villages, but to the cities.
During this period, no significant changes occurred in the infrastructure of Azerbaijani provinces. In the late 1950s, the Azerbaijani countryside consisted of villages where roads became impassable during rain and snow, and which lacked electricity, gas, and water, with houses resembling huts. Policies aimed at enrolling the rural population in schools were also unsuccessful. By the late 1950s, only 40% of the rural population had complete secondary education, and half of the children born on the eve of the Second World War did not even have primary education.[8] Mechanization of labor was extremely weak; peasants relied on manual labor and primitive tools in agricultural production. Although the Soviet state produced modern agricultural technologies, only a portion of collective farms were supplied with them. In one of his speeches in the late 1960s, Veli Akhundov, then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, admitted that only 20% of labor in the republic’s cotton fields was mechanized.[9]
According to statistical data from 1959, only 36,3% of the entire rural population worked in agriculture, and only 19% of this population had private household plots. The Soviet government assumed responsibility for all decisions related to the social and economic life of peasants: What to plant, how much to plant, at what price to sell the harvest, and which tools and machinery would be allocated to which collective farm were determined by local authorities based on decisions coming from the central government.[10]
Unemployment was the biggest problem of the Soviet countryside. Peasants engaged in seasonal work remained unemployed for most of the year and did not receive labor-day credits. For cotton-growing regions, 120 labor days per year were established, meaning that for 245 days of the year peasants were effectively unemployed. In a village with a population of 400, only 130 people (30%) had permanent full-time employment. Labor days were compensated not with wages but with agricultural products. In the 1950s, the average labor day of an Azerbaijani collective farmer was equal to 1 kilogram of grain, which was worth 1,50 rubles.[11] Peasants who worked more than 10 hours per day often did not receive adequate compensation for their labor. Collective farmers earned three times less than their compatriots working in state farms (sovkhozes) and four times less than workers employed in industrial enterprises.
The tax policy implemented in the Soviet countryside was one of the factors that made life in the provinces difficult. Since the authorities could not implement a unified tax system for the agricultural sector, peasants often had to pay more than they earned. The arbitrariness of local authorities, delays in implementing decisions, and abuses of power to fulfill state production plans increased tensions between peasants and the authorities. In 1954, when a commission of the Council of Ministers conducted inspections in the regions, it found that in many places, peasants were being taxed more than was prescribed by law. [12] The agrarian policy of the Soviet government did not serve to improve the everyday welfare of the Azerbaijani countryside. Even 20 years after the end of WWII, the Soviet authorities continued to hold regular discussions on how to solve the problem of hunger in the Azerbaijani provinces.[13]
The difficult social conditions of the Azerbaijani countryside were the main cause of the marginalization of the provincial population. In the mid-twentieth century, members of the Soviet nomenklatura, who were themselves largely of peasant origin, viewed the Soviet countryside as a backward province characterized by superstition, illiteracy, lack of culture, and political passivity. In fact, Soviet agrarian policy was aimed at the destruction of the peasantry as a class. Unlike workers, peasants — who were property-owning and religious — did not fit the social criteria of the Bolsheviks. The marginalization of the Soviet countryside by both representatives of the authorities and the elite strata (state officials and the intelligentsia), and their perception of peasants as a second-class population, were among the key factors that shaped both the relations between urban and provincial populations and the character of urbanization in the Soviet period.
Modernizing the Azerbaijani countryside
After Stalin’s death, the country’s leadership adopted several decisions concerning the agrarian sector. Although the Soviet authorities declared that these decisions were adopted to increase the efficiency of agriculture, in reality the aim was to make peasants more dependent on the state. One of the decisions adopted in March 1956 envisaged the reduction of peasants’ private household plots at the expense of collective farms.[14] This decision granted collective and state farm administrators the authority to determine the size of peasants’ private plots and further strengthened the arbitrariness of local authorities in the Azerbaijani provinces. In August 1956, two resolutions of the Council of Ministers regulated the feeding of livestock in both rural and urban areas. The first resolution prohibited feeding animals with bread, potatoes, flour, and other food products purchased from state stores.[15] The second resolution introduced a monetary tax for citizens who kept livestock in cities.[16] In December 1959, the Soviet government adopted a decision stating that the private household economy of collective farmers had lost its efficiency and ordered that livestock owned by collective and state farm workers be purchased by the state within two to three years.[17] This last decision enabled local authorities in the Azerbaijani provinces to confiscate peasants’ livestock without compensation.[18]
The next step taken by the Soviet authorities to increase efficiency in the agrarian sector was related to the consolidation of small administrative units (the policy of merging poor collective farms with wealthy ones). In the 1960s, nearly 2,5 million people living in the Azerbaijani provinces were settled in 4.359 settlements. These settlements were organized into 60 administrative units. The Azerbaijani leadership believed that by merging small administrative units they would improve their financial capacities. However, the economic merger of inefficient villages with economically stronger ones further increased social tensions in the provinces. During the consolidation process, part of the peasants’ private property was confiscated, and they were forcibly relocated to other areas.
Provincial residents who faced the aggressive agrarian policies of the Soviet government expressed their dissatisfaction in various ways. If before the war this manifested itself in the form of uprisings and rebellions, after the war peaceful protests became more common. The most widespread method of protest was sending complaint letters to central party authorities. In just one year, in 1960, 22.000 complaint letters were sent from the provinces to government authorities in Baku and Moscow. Because postal offices confiscated a large portion of complaint letters sent by citizens on the instructions of local authorities, this figure likely does not reflect the real scale of dissatisfaction. These letters complained about corruption in the provinces, clan favoritism, and the gross violation of peasants’ rights. Peasants complained about collective farm chairmen plundering collective farm property, delays in the payment of labor-day credits for months, and inhumane treatment. In these letters, provincial residents used the rhetoric of the authorities themselves, referring to Soviet laws and the constitution, and stated that the moral conduct and behavior of Soviet officials did not correspond to Soviet ideology.
Peasants also protested by showing disregard for Soviet government decisions. They refused to comply with tax policies whenever possible and sought to evade attempts to bind them to the land through various means. Peasants also expressed their protest by leaving their places of residence. The policy of merging administrative units resulted in 7 million peasants across the Soviet Union leaving their homes by the mid-1960s.[19] High levels of internal migration and the rapid depopulation of the provinces created labor shortages during seasonal harvest periods. During harvest time, this shortage was addressed by the forced mobilization of workers from Soviet enterprises, schoolteachers and students, medical staff, and university students to fields and plantations. The forced labor of children in the fields was one of the reasons why provincial residents sent complaint letters to the authorities. In letters sent to the central authorities, parents complained that their children were removed from education for at least three months each academic year.[20] Peasants living in border zones sometimes threatened the Soviet authorities by saying they would cross the border. One such incident occurred in May 1965 in the villages of Gazakhli and Mirzaagali in the Fuzuli region, where protesting peasants threatened to cross the Iranian border.[21]
After WWII, peasants had many reasons to leave the Azerbaijani provinces. Among these were the restriction of peasants’ economic opportunities and their increasing dependence on the state, mass unemployment, limited or nonexistent social services, abuses of power by local authorities, violations of the rights of provincial residents, and their complete subordination to the will of local authorities. The source of these problems was not the provincial population but the authorities. Provincial residents tried to struggle against these conditions using all possible peaceful means, but when this struggle proved unsuccessful, they were forced to leave their villages.
The new residents of the cities
Until the late 1950s, Azerbaijanis constituted only a small share of migration from the Azerbaijani provinces to the cities. One reason for this was the restrictive Soviet legislation related to urbanization, while another was the limited skills and qualifications of Azerbaijanis for employment in industrial enterprises. In the 1950s and 1960s, leaving the provinces—especially agricultural areas where cotton and other strategic crops were cultivated—was not easy. Soviet legislation required every adult peasant assigned to a collective farm to obtain permission documents from the collective farm chairman and the chairman of the executive committee in order to leave the collective farm. Young people used several methods to leave the village:
(1) those who successfully graduated from secondary school could leave to pursue higher education; (2) after completing military service, young men could go to cities instead of returning to their villages; (3) it was possible to obtain permission documents from authorized officials in exchange for bribes; (4) through relatives who had already settled in cities, one could obtain temporary residence registration and find employment in an industrial enterprise.
From the late 1950s onward, the demand for unskilled and cheap labor for large-scale construction projects carried out in cities significantly increased migration from the provinces to urban areas. Between 1959 and 1979, 90% of those who left the Azerbaijani provinces were Azerbaijanis. Official Soviet statistics claimed that between 1959 and 1972, 29% of the population of the Azerbaijani provinces migrated to cities, and half of the migrants were young men. Thirty-three percent of migrants settled in Azerbaijan’s three largest cities: Baku, Sumgait, and Kirovabad (modern Ganja).[22] Twenty years after the end of the war (between 1945 and 1965), alongside the rapid population growth in the provinces, the number of Azerbaijanis living in cities also began to increase. This indicates that migration from villages to cities accelerated during this period. In 1959, for the first time, the number of Azerbaijanis in cities exceeded the number of representatives of other nationalities.
Migrants from the provinces to the cities can be divided into two social categories. The migration of representatives of the rural upper strata, employees holding administrative positions in the provinces, and the children and relatives of state employees was usually related to education. Among this group, the number of those who returned to the countryside was very small; their return usually occurred only when they were appointed to administrative positions. Migration of representatives of poorer strata to cities typically resulted in employment in industrial enterprises and later in obtaining education and changing their social status. Return migration among this group was rare. Members of both groups often returned to their villages to marry, usually choosing spouses from among their fellow villagers, after which they returned to the city.
To determine the reasons why Azerbaijanis left their villages, face-to-face interviews were conducted with 80 individuals between 2018 and 2022. The interview participants were men born between 1935 and 1945. Because migration of Azerbaijani women to cities alone was not very common during that period, men were selected as the primary research subjects. Surveys were conducted in four cities of Azerbaijan (Baku, Ganja, Gazakh, and Shamkir). The cities were not specifically selected; the respondents who agreed to participate in the interviews happened to live in these cities. Of the 80 interview participants, 60 had graduated from vocational schools and 20 from higher education institutions. The majority of respondents identified unemployment and low wages (low labor-day compensation) as the main reasons for leaving the village. Among those born in the 1940s, some respondents (8 individuals) had left the village to pursue education. Respondents who had grown up in orphanages stated that they decided to remain in the city either because they had no relatives in the village or because they did not want to face their relatives there. Only 5 respondents stated that they left the village due to the lack of adequate social infrastructure. One respondent stated that his family was forced to leave the village due to threats from other villagers. Thus, the main reason for leaving the provinces was economic hardship.
Interview respondents stated that after earning income in the city, they did not consider sending financial assistance to the village, but they tried, whenever possible, to bring their family members to the city. Usually, men who had moved to the city helped their brothers move there as well. There were also attempts to bring unmarried sisters to the city. Older brothers helped or attempted to help their younger brothers obtain education or find employment in the cities.
Among the 80 individuals who migrated from the provinces to cities in the 1950s–1960s, 43 married women from their hometowns or relatives, while 37 married women they met in the city. Only three respondents married representatives of other nationalities. It should be noted that the continuous migration from the provinces to cities beginning in the 1950s created a gender imbalance in Azerbaijani villages, increasing the number of women in the provinces who remained unmarried.
Respondents believed that leaving their villages had been the right decision, noting that until the late 1980s there were no significant improvements in the social infrastructure of the provinces. Although the number of comfortable stone houses in villages increased from the mid-1960s onward, these houses were poorly supplied with water, electricity, and gas. Roads, schools, and transportation networks in the provinces also did not reach the desired level of development. Thirty-one respondents stated that the education they received in villages was sufficient to obtain a professional qualification in cities, while the rest recalled that the quality of education in rural schools was poor, and that teachers’ professional knowledge was limited.
After moving to the city, respondents also described the problems they faced. These problems can be divided into two groups: social and economic. Social problems consisted of barriers created by the Soviet administrative system, and respondents emphasized that they relied on the support of fellow villagers and relatives to overcome these obstacles. The biggest problem for migrants from the provinces was residence registration because it was impossible to obtain employment without registration documents. Because this document was issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, migrants from the provinces often had to bribe the police. In order to pay bribes, it was necessary to find personal connections. These connections were usually either fellow villagers or relatives of the new migrant. The cooperation, compact settlement patterns, and local solidarity among people from the same village or region in Azerbaijani cities were not inherent cultural characteristics of provincial residents; rather, they were the result of migrants’ attempts to overcome the restrictive legislation of the Soviet system. Urban residents did not need such cooperation or support, as they lived in familiar environments. This strong cooperation and mutual assistance among migrants from the provinces, as well as the practice of officials hiring their fellow countrymen or helping them find jobs, became one of the causes of tension between urban residents and newcomers.
The second social problem faced by migrants from the provinces was related to language. Azerbaijan’s industrial centers were largely multinational and Russian-speaking cities. In these cities, at least half of the population consisted of representatives of other nationalities. The working language of state institutions was Russian. Russian was not used in the provinces, and the level of Russian language proficiency there was very low. Russification, which was the most long-lasting component of the cultural legacy of the Soviet Empire, was another cause of conflict between urban residents and newcomers and contributed to the marginalization of migrants from the provinces.
The biggest social problem faced by migrants from the provinces who moved to cities was, of course, related to cultural differences. There was a significant social divide between Azerbaijan’s multinational and Russian-speaking urban centers and the Azerbaijani-speaking poor peripheral neighborhoods where workers predominantly lived. The central districts of the cities had long since become urbanized and belonged to the cultural sphere of Russian-speaking Azerbaijani officials and intellectuals who were distant from physical labor.[23] This cultural sphere perceived itself as closer to Russian and Western culture. In contrast, in working-class neighborhoods where people were primarily engaged in physical labor and spoke Azerbaijani, provincial culture predominated. This cultural difference created tensions between urbanized relatives and locals on the one hand and new migrants (peasants) on the other.
Although the Soviet government claimed to strive for social equality, social welfare was not equally accessible to everyone. Urban residents—those familiar with the rules and norms of the local urban environment—had easier access to social welfare. They lived in better parts of the city, in better apartments, worked in better jobs, and studied at more prestigious institutes. Urban residents, especially those who considered themselves native Baku residents, were the ones who set standards of dress, behavior, lifestyle, and artistic taste. Those who did not conform to this style, those who were different, were marginalized.
One of the reasons for tension between urban residents and newcomers was precisely this marginalization of those who did not fit the appearance and behavior associated with urban residents. However, migrants from the provinces were marginalized not by representatives of other nationalities but by Azerbaijanis themselves. These relations are clearly illustrated in the 1972 Azərbaycanfilm production Life Tests Us (Həyat bizi sınayır). In the film, Məsi, who had left the village many years earlier and become urbanized while working as an engineer at the Ministry of Trade, does not want to accept into his home his younger brother Rəşid, who has just arrived from the village. He sees him as a burden and tries to send him back to the village, attempting to convince him that he does not possess sufficient culture, knowledge, or skills to remain in the city.
Another social problem faced by migrants from the provinces in cities was the restriction of their access to social benefits. Migrants had to overcome various obstacles in order to access social services. Those who built huts on the outskirts of cities to improve their living conditions (urban residents called these buildings nakhalstroy, meaning shameless illegal construction) could not obtain construction materials without official permits. In order to obtain permits and to ensure that the police ignored the construction, they were forced to pay bribes. Since the passport registration regime was enforced in cities such as Baku, Sumgait, and Kirovabad, it was necessary to obtain residence registration for houses built without permission. For this, migrants had to bribe both the police and local executive authorities. Those who accepted bribes were mostly urban residents, while those who paid bribes were newcomers. The fact that migrants from the provinces were forced to pay bribes for almost everything was one of the factors that worsened relations between urban residents and newcomers. The former felt themselves in a superior position relative to the latter and regulated their treatment of newcomers according to this perceived hierarchy.
Conclusion
Until WWII, Soviet migration policy was aimed at achieving two contradictory goals: accelerating industrialization and reducing the gap between the city and the countryside. Rapid industrialization increased the demand for labor, but it was not easy to meet this demand at the expense of the agricultural sector, which was responsible for supplying cities with food. There was only one way to increase agricultural productivity without increasing the demand for labor in agriculture: the mechanization of agriculture. However, the mechanization of agriculture required the acceleration of industrialization. Faced with this dilemma, the Soviet authorities focused primarily on industrialization and used the passport system and temporary residence registration practices to control migration from villages to cities.
After WWII, the need to rebuild hundreds of destroyed cities, villages, and settlements, as well as to provide employment and housing for hundreds of thousands of demobilized soldiers, forced Soviet authorities to reconsider migration policy. In order to accelerate urbanization, Soviet authorities attempted to make urban life more attractive and rural life more unbearable. Government policies in the provinces deprived peasants of basic civil rights, and those who demanded their rights were threatened through various means. The main task of local authorities was to neutralize dissatisfied peasants and transform them into passive citizens who would unconditionally obey government orders and decisions. While the older generation, exhausted by the plunder, harsh Stalinist repressions, deportations, and arrests that accompanied the establishment of Soviet rule, often ignored such treatment by the authorities, the younger generation did not want to accept this situation and rightly believed that they deserved a better and more comfortable life.
[1] Всесоюзная перепись населения 1970 года. Городское и сельское население областей республик СССР (кроме РСФСР) по полу и национальности. Бакинский Горсовет. Таблица 7с. Распределение населения по национальности, родному и второму языку. РГАЭ. Ф.1562 Оп. 336 Д.4014-4101.
[2] Климат Азербайджана. Баку: Академия Наук Азербайджанской ССР, 1968, p.232-234; Бабаханов Н. А. Стихийные природные явления в Азербайджане и борьба с ними. Баку: Азербайджанский Институт Народного Хозяйства им Д. Буниятзаде. 1985, p.147.
[3] Şəlalə Məmmədova. Cənubi Qafqaz 1920-1930-cu illərdə. Azərbaycan məsələləri. Mütərcim, 2020, 259-60.
[4] This figure was first mentioned in the book of Soviet historian Alexander Artemyev: Артемьев А.П. Братский боевой союз народов СССР в годы Великой Отечественной войны. М.:Мысль, 1975.
[5] Центральный Архив Министерство Обороны (ЦАМО). Ф. 7. Оп. 26. Д. 123. Л. 2, 21; Д. 181. Л. 35; Д. 220. Л. 29–48; Д. 234. Л. 27–46, Д. 366. Л. 1–17. Mənbə əldə edilib: Безугольный А.Ю. Этнический аспект комплектования Красной армии в годы Великой Отечественной войны: историко‐статистический обзор Вестник РУДН. Серия: История России, 2020 Vol. 19 No 2 , c. 303.
[6] Россия и СССР в войнах XX в. Потери вооружённых сил. Олма-Пресс. 2001. s. 501.
[7] Şəlalə, Məmmədova. Yaddaşımızdakı tarix. Stalindən sonrakı Azərbaycan. Elm və Təhsil, 2022, 379-381.
[8] Итоги Всесоюзной переписи населения 1959 года: Азербайджанская ССР, Государственное статистическое издательство, 1963, c.12, 18 -19.
[9] Vəli, Axundov. Azərbaycan kəndinin sabahkı günü. Azərnəşr, 1969, s.6.
[10] On the Azerbaijani village after World War II, see: Jamil, Hasanli. Khrushchev’s Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield., 2014, 425-427: Şəlalə Məmmədova. Yaddaşımızdakı tarix. Stalindən sonrakı Azərbaycan. Elm və Təhsil, 2022, 294-296.
[11] Выдачи колхозникам по трудодням зерна и денег, и отчисления в неделимые фонды колхозов в 1948, 1949 и 1950-е годы. СШО ЦСУ СССР, 23.06.1951, c.9.
[12] Azərbaycan SSR Nazirlər Sovetinin 102 saylı qərarı. 28 yanvar 1954. Azərbaycan Respublikası Dövlət Arxivi (ARDA), f. 2828, siy. 2, iş 164, v..89-90.
[13] Azərbaycan SSR Nazirlər Sovetinin 1950-60-cı illərdə keçirilən məxfi iclaslarının protokolları. ARDA, f.411, siy. 43, iş vahidi 19, v. 33, 45, 56; Центральный Архив Федеральной Службы Безопасности России (ЦА ФСБ России), ф.3, оп.4, д.1949, л.107-108, 109-111.
[14] “Об уставе сельскохозяйственной артели и дальнейшем развитии инициативы колхозников в организации колхозного производства и управлении делами артели”. Известия, 10 марта, 1956.
[15] “О мерах борьбы с расходованием из государственных фондов хлеба и других продовольственных продуктов на корм скоту”, Правда, 28 август, 1956.
[16] “О денежном налоге с граждан, имеющих скот в городах”, Правда, 28 август, 1956.
[17] “Решения партии и правительства по хозяйственным вопросам”. В 5z məktublarının göndərilməsi idi. т.: Сборник документов за 50 лет. Т. 4. 1953–1961 гг. M.: Политическое издательство, 1968, с. 92.
[18] “Azərbaycan SSR Baş Prokuroru Gambay Məmmədovun MK-ya hesabatı”. 1965-ci il. Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin İşlər İdarəsi İctimai-Siyasi Sənədlər Arxivi (ARPİİİSSA), f.1, si. 52, iş 124, v.41-43.
[19] Попов В. П. ““Второй и важнейший этап” (об укрупнении колхозов в 50-е — нач. 60-х гг.)”. Отечественные архивы. 1994. № 1. c. 35.
[20] Sovet İttifaqı Kommunist Partiyası Mərkəzi Komitəsinin qərarı. 1965-сi il. ARPİİİSSA, f.1, siy.52, iş vahidi 118, v.8
[21] Məmmədova, 2022, 91-2; İictimai Asayişin Qorunması Nazirliyi Milis idarəsinin cinayət axtarışı şöbəsinin rəisinin MK-ya hesabatı. 1965-ci il 17 may, ARPİİİSSA, f.1, siy.52, iş vahidi 124, v.71-74.
[22] Топилин А. В. Территориальное перераспределение трудовых ресурсов в СССР. Москва: Экономика, 1975, с. 41; Социальные факторы и особенности миграции населения СССР. Москва: Наука, 1978, с. 93.
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